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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN A MANAGED CARE WORLD:
SHOULD CONSUMERS CALL 911?
DAVID

A.

HYMAN*

"In some ways, it's less frustratingfor us to take care of homeless people
than H.M.0. members. At least, we can do what we think is right for
them, as opposed to trying to convince an H.M.O. over the phone of
what's the right thing to do. '

O

I.

INTRODUCTION

NCE upon a time, managed care was popular. Admittedly, writings
that begin with the words "once upon a time" are usually classified as
fairy tales. 2 Until quite recently, however, managed care actually was popular. 3 Things change; in the last three years, the reputation of managed
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. In commenting
on an earlier article, William Frazier, Associate General Counsel of RushPrudential Health Plans, suggested that false burglar alarms presented an
interesting model for the issues created by regulating access to emergency care.
The expansion of his suggestion into a full-blown narrative was my own doing. Bill
Brewbaker provided helpful comments. As always, all errors of commission or
omission are mine alone.
1. Robert Pear, H.M.0. 's Refusing Emergency Claims, HospitalsAssert: 2 Missions
in Conflict, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1995, at Al.
2. But see Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Politically Incorrect, 48 SMU L. REv. 411, 411 n.2
(1995) (noting that phrase "fairy tales" is politically incorrect because it reflects
heterosexual bias; "bedtime stories" is politically correct terminology).
3. To be sure, if the number of Americans enrolled in managed care organizations (MCOs) is any indication, managed care remains extraordinarily popular.
See Karen Davis & Cathy Schoen, Managed Care, Choice, and Patient Satisfaction (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.cmwf.org/health-care/satis.html> ("Based on preliminary data from the 1997 Kaiser/Commonwealth National Health Insurance Survey
.. . Managed care plans dominate employment-based coverage. Altogether, 71
percent of employed, insured working families under age 65 are in managed care
plans."). Another set of commentators noted that
[t]his year, for the first time, managed care attracted the majority of
Americans. More sign up every day. Managed care now provides coverage for 77 percent of Americans and their dependents who are insured
through their employers according to Mercer/Foster Higgins employer
survey data. In addition, 80,000 elderly Americans each month are
switching to Medicare HMOs, largely because of the cost savings they
offer.
Susan Brink & Nancy Shute, Are HMOs the Right Prescription?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 60. Managed care executives also trumpet the results of
their consumer surveys, which invariably reflect high levels of satisfaction among
their enrollees. See Michael E. Herbert, A For-Profit Health Plan's Experience and
Strategy, 17 HEALTH AiF. 121, 121 (1997) (noting that "sophisticated patient satisfaction surveys indicate that ... the overwhelming majority of members are satis-
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care has been severely tarnished by a rising chorus of complaints. 4
Public hostility to managed care was intensified by the efforts of the
modern equivalents of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: the media,
academics, lawyers and legislators. 5 The media provided hundreds of
anecdotes about the misdeeds of managed care and editorials bemoaning
the changes in the medical marketplace. 6 Academics produced a host of
fled with the quality of care they are receiving in HMOs"). The general assessment
of managed care is considerably less favorable.
4. See Louise Kertesz, Backlash Continues: Survey Finds Managed Care Is Still the
Bad Guy in Many Americans'Eyes, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 10, 1997, at 33 ("People
seem to generalize from anecdotal reports in the news about problems with managed care. When asked about specific examples taken from news stories about the
problems some people have reported ... with managed care, the public's perception is that these are fairly common occurrences."); Maggie Mahar, Time for a
Checkup, BARRON'S, Mar. 4, 1996, at 29, 30 ("As if smelling blood in the water,
newspapers and magazines have turned from cheerful if boring tales of HMO's
ability to contain costs to horror stories about patients who requested a particular
procedure, were turned down by HMO administrators, and subsequently died.").
One commentator observed that
[p] ractically everybody covered by a managed-care health insurance plan
has some story about a suffered indignity, petty or grand, foisted on him
or her by a callous or ignorant health insurer .... Even if one's annoyance is trivial, it makes a person inclined to nod one's head vigorously
when hearing about the major-league horrors HMOs are alleged to inflict
on helpless citizens. And one hears it a lot these days. Over the past
several months, we have had newsmagazine covers and presidential pronouncements replete with anecdotal horror stories about treatments denied and 'gag rules' imposed by HMOs on their physicians to keep
patients in the dark about the best treatment available to them .... In the
time-honored journalistic tradition of championing the average guy
against the rapacious big-money interests, it has become a mainstay for
news editors to order stories on outrages among HMOs. Reading the
stories and hearing the speeches, it is easy to believe that HMOs are all
run by greedy and rapacious sadists concerned more about squeezing out
an extra dollar of profit than providing basic aid and comfort to afflicted
policyholders. And lots of distinguished people, including notjust politicians but also physicians and hospital administrators, are saying just that.
Norman Ornstein, HMO's Rightful Credo: No Pain, No Gain, USA TODAY, Mar. 24,
1997, at 15A.
5. But see Revelations 6:1-4 (noting that Four Horseman of Apocalypse are Conquest, War, Famine and Death).
6. See, e.g.,
Brink & Shute, supra note 3, at 60 (collecting anecdotes of bad
outcomes involving managed care); Susan Brink, How Your HMO Could Hurt You:
Managed-CareDoctors Concerned about Their Incomes Have an Incentive to Stint on Care,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 62 (collecting anecdotes); Edward
Dolnick, Death by HMO-One Woman's Horror Story, GLAMOUR, Feb. 1996, at 158
(recounting anecdote of bad outcome involving managed care); It's Time to Put
Limits on Power of HMO's; Fora Human Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996, at A22
(editorializing in favor of consumer protection against managed care); Erik Larson, The Soul ofa HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44 (collecting anecdotes); The Rights
of Patients, by Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A14 (editorializing that patients'
rights should be protected); Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware Your HMO, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
23, 1995, at 54 (collecting anecdotes). For a compilation of hundreds of such
anecdotes, see GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST
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articles about the perils of managed care. 7 Lawyers filed claims seeking
staggering sums for cost-cutting behavior that they found overly aggressive,
and at least some juries agreed with them.8 Finally, legislators and regulators proposed and enacted a wide array of so-called "consumer
9
protections."
Television has also exploited the dramatic potential of managed care. See
Burkhard Bilger, TV's Powerful Doctor Shows vs. the H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1996, at H41 (noting that television dramas use MCOs to "play the same role that
Russians and Arabs used to play in movies: dark forces against which the forces of
light must battle."); Barbara D. Phillips, He's No Giuliani,WALL ST.J., Oct. 6, 1997,
at A20 ("The big HMO and its employees are depicted as greedy at best, evil at
worst-white-collar gangsters deserving of whatever federal threats and punishments can be brought to bear.").
7. See, e.g., Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Managed
Care Organizations,23J.L. & MED. ETHICS 223, 223 (1996) (distinguishing between
(bad) for-profit and (good) non-profit plans); Carolyn M. Clancy & Howard
Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll orHyde?, 273JAMA 338, 338 (1995) (evaluating impact
of managed care on traditional medicine); EzekielJ. Emanuel & Nancy N. Dubler,
Preserving the Physician-PatientRelationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323,
325 (1995) (contrasting managed care with ideal physician-patient relationship);
Norman G. Levinsky, Social, Institutional, and Economic Barriersto the Exercise of Patients' Rights, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 532, 532 (1996) (evaluating role of managed
care in limiting patient's rights); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332
NEw ENG. J. MED. 604, 605 (1995) (criticizing potential of managed care to limit
amount of care given to patients).
8. See David Leon Moore, Ethics Pinched by the System, Lawyer Says, USA TODAY,
Jan. 22, 1996, at DI (noting that California jury awarded $89 million, including
$77 million in punitive damages for denial of coverage of bone marrow transplant
for advanced breast cancer); Roger Parloff, The HMO Foes, AM. LAw., July-Aug.
1996, at 80 (noting that some patients have won lawsuits against HMOs for their
refusal to pay for costly lifesaving treatments); see also Barry R. Furrow, Managed
Care Organizations and PatientInjury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GEORGIA L. REv. 419,
425 (1997) (arguing that judicious use of tort litigation can improve the quality of
managed care); Harvey S. Wachsman, Letter to Editor, Reforms Must Target HMOs
and Their CEOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1997, at A19 ("The one [consumer] reform
that would truly make a difference would be to hold managed-care companies and
their executives accountable when their actions and policies destroy people's
lives."); Ellen Wertheimer, Ockham's Scalpel: A Return to a Reasonableness Standard,
43 VILL. L. Riv. 321 (1998) (arguing that there is nothing with managed care that
passel of plaintiffs lawyers cannot fix).
9. See Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?,
335 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1601, 1601 (1996) ("In 1996 alone, 1000 pieces of legislation
attempting to regulate or weaken HMOs were introduced in state legislatures, and
56 laws were passed in 35 states."); Fred J. Hellinger, The Expanding Scope of State
Legislation, 276 JAMA 1065, 1066 (1996) (noting growing enthusiasm for regulation of managed care); Jerome P. Kassirer, Managing Managed Care's Tarnished Image, 337 NEw ENG.J. MED. 338, 338 (1997) ("[A]t the last count some 1000 bills to
control health-plan practices have been introduced in 39 states, and approximately
100 have been introduced in Congress."); Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation:
In the Laboratory of the States, 278JAMA 1102, 1102 (1997) (describing state regulatory initiatives); Marc A. Rodwin, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1319, 1335-44 (1996) (describing recent proposals to protect consumers from managed care); Marilyn Werber
Serafini, Reining in the HMOs, NAT'L J., Oct. 26, 1996, at 2280 (describing state
legislative initiatives against managed care); see also Brink & Shute, supra note 3, at
60 ("This year states passed a record 182 laws on managed care, up from 100 in
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The conventional wisdom is that each of these developments has its
place in ensuring the protection of those enrolled in managed care plans.
This Article argues that at least when it comes to legislation, consumer
protection is at best an incidental (and at worst a highly unlikely) byproduct of much of this effort. 10 Designing effective consumer protections is difficult under the best of circumstances (readily identifiable
villains, problems soluble through straightforward structural responses
that create minimal collateral consequences and monitoring expenses,
and ample funds for enforcement). Unfortunately, the circumstances
under which managed care is regulated are far from this ideal. Predictably enough, many of the resulting consumer protection laws either induce worse distortions than the problems they purport to solve or the
"reforms" have been hijacked to serve the economic interests of the health
care providers who were losing market share, autonomy and income to
managed care. Even if these efforts actually protected consumers, there
are no free lunches.1 " The costs are reflected either in increased premi1996. Nineteen states passed comprehensive managed-care laws or regulations
that should address the broad spectrum of consumer complaints."); George J.
Church, Backlash Against HMOs, TIME, Apr. 14, 1997, at 32 (discussing legislative
measures taken against managed care); Milt Freudenheim, Baby Boomers Force New
Rules for H.M.O. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Freudenheim, Baby
Boomers] ("More than 1,000 managed-care bills were introduced in state legislatures last year. Congress also enacted new requirements."); Milt Freudenheim,
HMO's Cope with a Backlash on Cost Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1996, at 1 (reviewing recent bills and statutes); Milt Freudenheim, PioneeringState for Managed Care
Considers Change, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1997, at Al (stating that California and other
states nationwide are reviewing regulation of managed care systems); David S.
Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds over Managed Care: FrustratedConsumers Pushfor Tougher
Laws, WASH. PoST, June 30, 1997, at Al (collecting examples of legislative actions);
Richard A. Knox, State Legislatures Take on HMOs' Managed Care Policies, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 24, 1996, at A12 (commenting on "flood of new laws aimed at
problems and abuses" and stating that "[i]n the first six months of this year, 33
states passed managed care legislation, often with bipartisan support"); Laurie McGinley, State Legislators Pushfor Safeguardsfor PatientsCovered by Managed Care, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997, at A3 (describing how bipartisan group of legislators from
nine states developed comprehensive legislation to strengthen state safeguards for
patients covered by managed care); More States Join Nationwide Trend of Regulating
Managed Care Networks, 66 U.S.L.W. 2026, 2026 (July 8, 1997) (discussing increased
state regulation of MCOs); Peter Passell, In Medicine, Government Rises Again, N.Y.
TIMES,

Dec. 7, 1997, at 4:1 ("Many states are regulating everything from the length

of a hospital stay for a mastectomy to the financial incentives that H.M.O.'s give to
physicians for denying treatment. And Congress is flooded with similar ad hoc
proposals from both sides of the aisle .... "); Spencer Rich, Managed Care, Once an
Elixir, Goes Under Legislative Knife; Cost-CuttingFocus FearedHarmful to Patients,WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 1996, at Al (discussing legislative responses to managed health
care); Families USA, HMO Consumers at Risk: States to the Rescue (visited Mar. 1,
1998) <http://epn.org/families/farisk.html> (containing information on state legislative efforts).
10. Whether the efforts of the media, academics and tort lawyers have had a
net beneficial impactis beyond the scope of this Article.
11. See William Safire, On Language; Words out in the Cold, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1993, at 6:14 (tracing origin of phrase "there ain't no such thing as a free lunch").

The phrase and the corresponding acronym ("TANSTAAFL") originated in the

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/3

4

1998]

Hyman: Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers Cal
413

CONSUMER PROTECTION IN A MANAGED CARE WORLD

ums or decreased access to other medical services, and ex ante, it is unlikely that consumers actually desire that result.
Part II surveys the complaints that have been made about managed
care. 12 Part III provides a brief overview of the consumer protections that
have been proposed or enacted in the last few years.' 3 Part IV focuses on
a particularly benign-sounding "consumer protection," which seeks to ensure access to emergency medical services for those enrolled in managed
care, in order to make plain the implications, trade-offs and potential for
rent-seeking associated with such legislation. 14 Part V provides a narrative
perspective on the issues. 15 Parts VI and VII summarize the implications
16
of the analysis and offer some conclusions.
II.

COMPLAINTS ABOUT MANAGED CARE

In a relatively short time, managed care has captured an impressive
share of the U.S. health care market. 17 The basic premise of managed
care is that high quality health care can be delivered at reasonable cost by
coordinating the behavior of providers or insurers and patients. The conventional formulation is that managed care is cheaper and better than feefor-service medicine because it reduces the incidence of wasteful and inap19th century, but was popularized by economist Milton Friedman, who published a
book with that title in 1975. Id. In 1977, Friedman told members of the Knesset
Finance Committee in Jerusalem: "There is no such thing as a free lunch. That is
the sum of my economic theory. The rest is elaboration." Richard Lederer, On
Language; Hunted Words, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, at 6:14.
The best known corollary to the "no free lunch" rule was provided by a onetime colleague of Friedman, George Stigler: "There may be no such thing as a free
lunch, but there are a lot of people eating them." An equally pointed observation,
commonly attributed to Thomas Sowell, is that "although there may be no such
thing as a free lunch, that doesn't keep politicians from sending out engraved
invitations."
12. For a discussion of the varied complaints which have been made about
managed care, see infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of state and federal legislation created in response to
complaints about managed care, see infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of a case study of consumer protection, see infta notes 57127 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of managed care issues from a narrative context, see infra
notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the implications of consumer protection for the cost
and quality of health care, see infra notes 135-52 and accompanying text. For the
conclusion of this Article, see infra notes 153-78 and accompanying text.
17. See James C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, The Growth of Medical
Groups Paid Through Capitation in California, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1684, 1685
(1995) (noting rapid growth in numbers of enrollees whose care was paid for by
capitation); see alsoJohn K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Managed Care,
327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 742, 743 (1992) (charting rise of membership in HMOs);
John K. Iglehart, The Struggle Between Managed Care and Fee-for-Service Practice, 331
NEw ENG.J. MED. 63, 64 (1994) (noting increase in number of patients covered by
managed care). For a further discussion of the popularity of managed care, see
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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propriate care, lowers the risk of iatrogenic harm, emphasizes preventative
care and healthy living and integrates the confusing world of health care
into a seamless web of services. Each managed care organization (MCO)
uses its own mix of carrots and sticks to accomplish these objectives, including required pre-authorization, restricted access to specialists, panels
of authorized providers, higher copayments (and sometimes denial of coverage) for out-of-network care, capitation, bonuses, practice guidelines,
retrospective denials of coverage, restricted formularies and limitations on
benefits. 18 In global terms, MCOs offer a more restricted choice of (and
access to) providers and treatments in exchange for lower premiums, deductibles and copayments than traditional indemnity insurance.
Despite the pleasant picture suggested by the preceding paragraph,
complaints about managed care have become legion. The general assessment was summed up nicely by an irate patient: "IT]he H.M.O. said I
wouldn't have bills, and that's great, but what I do have instead is tsoris."19
Specific complaints vary considerably, depending on who is asked. Those
who have sought assistance for psychiatric problems and substance abuse
complain that MCOs emphasize short-term treatment and shred patient
confidentiality. 20 Women complain about restricted access to gynecologists, "drive-through" deliveries and "drive-through" mastectomies. 2 1 Pa-

18. See Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements ManagedCare Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1680 (1995) (noting
that managed care plans employ complex systems for selecting, paying and monitoring providers).
19. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Complications in Care: A Special Report; Patients with
Difficult Illnesses Fight New H.M.O.'s to Get Help, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1996, at Al
(quoting patient with chronic illness). "Tsoris" means "troubles, woes, worries,
and suffering" in Yiddish. LEO ROSTEN, THE JOYS OFYIDDISH 411 (1968). As Professor George Cohen has pointed out to this author, conscientious articles editors are
a major source of tsoris for law professors.
20. See Lawrence I. Sank, When Managed Care Meets Mental Health, BALTIMORE
SUN, Nov. 11, 1996, at 11A ("The managed-care process, involving ongoing oversight of mental health care, is intrinsically destructive to the patient .... The most
vulnerable patients are subject to psychological harassment that causes them to
drop out of treatment prematurely or, perhaps, not pursue necessary treatment at
all."); see alsoJ.K. Iglehart, Managed Care and Mental Health, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED.
131, 131 (1996) (cataloguing therapists' complaints about managed care); Miles F.
Shore & Allan Beigel, The Challenges Posed by Managed Behavioral Health Care, 334
NEw ENG.J. MED. 116, 116 (1996) (questioning managed care's policy of limiting

coverage of mental health care); Carol Hymowitz & Ellen Joan Pollock, Psychobattle:
Cost-Cutting Firms Monitor Couch Time as Therapists Fret: Managed-Care Outfits Favor
Drugs and Brief Therapy, Discourage Hospital Stays: "A Tough, Tough Business, "WALL
ST. J., July 13, 1995, at Al (criticizing limited mental health care benefits in
HMOs); Leslie Laurence, Your Mental Health Under Managed Care, GLAMOUR, Oct.
1996, at 56 (stating that "drugs are in, talk therapy is out"); Tamar Lewin, A Loss of
Confidence: A Special Report; Questions of Privacy Roil Arena of Psychotherapy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 1996, at Al (discussing conflict between confidentiality and managed care oversight); Ellen Joan Pollock, Sobering Up: HMOs Push Cheaper, ShortTerm Rehab, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1996, at BI (noting complaints about managed
care's efforts to contain rehabilitation costs).
21. See David A. Hyman, Drive-Thru Deliveries: Is Consumer ProtectionJust What
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tients who require specialized care or ongoing treatment for chronic
illnesses complain about the knowledge and ability of the MCOs' specialists and restricted access to expensive medications. 22 People requiring
cutting-edge treatments complain that MCOs refuse to authorize reimbursement. 23 Advocates for the poor complain that MCOs are not truly
committed to providing care to such patients. 24 People opposed to euthathe Doctor Ordered? (Feb. 9, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Laura Johannes, More HMOs Order Outpatient Mastectomies, WALL ST. J., Nov.
6, 1996, at BI (observing that outpatient mastectomies grew from 1.6% of total
number performed in 1991 to 7.6% in 1995 because of pressure from MCOs);
Leslie Laurence, Women's Health at Risk: The Hidden Dangers of Managed Care, GLAMOUR, Aug. 1996, at 202 (complaining about restricted access to gynecologists); Diane Levick, New Health Care Concern: Drive-Through Mastectomies, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 8, 1996, at Al (criticizing health plan's refusal to cover overnight
stays); Martha Shirk, 'Drive Through Delivery," CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1995, at 7 (criticizing rapid postpartum discharge); Nora L. Tooher, Baby, That's Fast! Hospitals Get
Ready to Send Mothers Home 24 Hours After Delivery, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Dec. 18,
1994, at 8H (same).
Elderly woman have their own set of complaints as well. See Associated Press,
Older Women and Managed Care; Report Indicates a Plan May Try to Restrict Access to
Services, BALTIMORE SUN, May 8, 1997, at 3C (noting higher incidence of illnesses
among older women means they need "more access to specialists, leading-edge
medicine, and technology," but "managed care, by design to save money, attempts
to restrict these things").
22. Milt Freudenheim, Many H.M. O. s EasingRules On Seeking Specialists' Care,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at Al ("They are known as gatekeepers, and they are what
many Americans dislike most about their health maintenance organizations. They
are the primary-care doctors who must say yes before a patient can see a specialist."); Robert Pear, Expense Means Many Can't Get Drugsfor AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1997, at Al ("Even though new drugs show great promise in combating AIDS,
many patients are finding that they cannot easily get the costly medicines because
of restrictions imposed by health maintenance organizations .... Some H.M.O.'s
say they limit pharmacy benefits to a specified amount ... [which] is far less than
the cost of the drug combinations often recommended by doctors."); Elisabeth
Rosenthal, Managed Care Has Trouble TreatingAIDS, PatientsSay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1996, at Al (chronicling AIDS patients' complaints about managed care); Diana K.
Sugg, Hopkins to Offer HMO for AIDS; Program, Among First in Nation, Aims to Pair
Efficiency and Quality, BALTIMORE SUN,Jan. 17, 1996, at BI ("People with AIDS typically dislike managed care. Patients and advocacy groups complain of primary
care physicians unaware of the latest findings and fumbling through treatment.").
23. See Brent Weston & Marie Lauria, PatientAdvocacy in the 1990s, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 543, 543 (1996) (describing patient requiring bone marrow transplant referred from original facility to two other (far-away) facilities despite significant personal reasons for having transplant performed at first facility); Susan
Brink, The Cancer Wars at HMOs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 1996, at 69
(noting HMO denials of coverage for cancer treatment in clinical trials); Lucette
Lagnado, But Who Will Pay For the High Cost of Relie?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1996, at
BI (stating that "managed care views pain as a big black hole into which they keep
dumping money"); Rosenthal, supra note 19, at Al (noting complaints about restricted access to subspecialists).
24. See, e.g., Anna-Katrina S. Christakis, Comment, Emergency Room Gatekeeping:
A New Twist on PatientDumping, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 295, 319-20 (noting bureaucratic
managed care approach can alienate poor patients); David R. Olmos, A Medi-Cal
Matter; HMOs Are Aggressively Trying to Sign Up the Indigent; Critics Worry That Oversight of Recruitment Tactics May Be Inadequate, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1996, at DI
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nasia or physician-assisted suicide complain that MCOs will put pressure
25

on doctors to kill their patients.
Health care providers have their own complaints. Clinicians complain about the loss of income and professional autonomy, slow payment,

and "gag clauses," which keep them from telling their patients about quality issues and available (but uncovered) treatments. 2 6 Academic health
("When a big HMO wanted to sponsor health fairs at a Boyle Heights elementary
school, educators faced a quandary. Was the private company, Foundation Health,
sincerely interested in improving the health of poor children and their families?
Or was it just trying to drum up business?"); see also Note, The Impact of Managed
Care on Doctors Who Serve Poor and Minority Patients, 108 l-HAv. L. REv. 1625, 1625-26
(1995) (arguing managed care will undermine safety-net institutions that have traditionally provided care to the poor and uninsured).
25. See, e.g., John R. Corboy, Correspondence, 336 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 439, 439
("How will the managed-care physician, whose income depends on lowering the
costs of medical care, react when a patient who is depressed and seriously ill, but
maybe not terminally so, asks for help with suicide? Will the physician be able to
resist the lure of the enhanced income that accompanies the hastened death of
the patient?"); Leon R. Kass & Nelson Lund, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics, and the Future of the Medical Profession, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 395, 406 (1996) ("In this
new medico-economic climate, with for-profit hospital corporations and HMOs,
the removal of the ban against physician-assisted suicide becomes even more dangerous: a quick death will often be the most cost-effective 'therapeutic option' and
will therefore be ever more frequently employed ....");Susan M. Wolf, PhysicianAssisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 455, 479 (1996) (arguing that enthusiasts of physician-assisted suicide do not understand context in
which treatment takes place and stating that "[t]o ignore the problems posed by
the growing prevalence of managed care is a mistake. In the name of supposed
individual rights, it blesses a practice of assisted suicide driven by financial incentives and the needs of health care organizations.").
Even those who are keen on physician-assisted suicide recognize the problem.
See George J. Annas, Correspondence, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 441, 441 (1997) ("Since
assisted suicide will always be the cheapest 'treatment,' and since it will cure literally every disease, declaring it a constitutional right could make promoting it as a
new choice irresistible to those for-profit managed care companies that are more
dedicated to enhancing their bottom lines than caring for their patients.").
26. See, e.g.,
CorporateManaged Care, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1060, 1060 (1996)
(collecting letters in response to earlier article); Jennifer D'Isidori, Stop Gagging
Physicians!, 7 HEALTH MATRiX 187, 190 (1997) (criticizing gag clauses as violating
physician-patient fiduciary relationship); Julia A. Martin & Linda K. Bjerknes, The
Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag Clauses in Physician Contracts,22 Am.J. L. & MED.
433, 441-43 (1997) (describing types of gag clauses); Steffie Woolhandler & David
U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New CorporatePropositionfor Physicians, 333 NEw
ENG.J. MED. 1706, 1706 (1995) (criticizing limitations put on doctors in managed
care); Milt Freudenheim, Dragging Out HMO Payments; Are Health Care Companies
ProfitingFrom the 'Float'?,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1997, at DI (stating that "hospitals,
doctors and patients are complaining that as H.M.O.'s take on many of the functions of traditional insurers, they are adding to costs and interfering with care by
taking longer to pay their bills"); Milt Freudenheim, Doctors' Incomes Fall as Managed Care Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at Al (evaluating negative effect of
managed care on physician income); Robert Pear, Doctors Say H.M.O. 's Limit What
They Can Tell Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at Al (describing physician complaints about gag clauses). But see Uwe E. Reinhardt, Leave the Market Alone: Providers Complain HMOs Take Too Long to Pay But the Culprit is Supply and Demand, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Sept. 22, 1997, at 40 (arguing that slow payments are attributable to
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center administrators and researchers complain that America's future physicians cannot be trained and clinical research cannot be conducted on
the amounts MCOs are paying for inpatient care. 27 Hospitals, nurses and
independent pharmacists complain about their tenuous position in the
newly competitive health care marketplace. 28 Everyone complains about
the administrative and marketing overhead, the appeals process and the
excessive profits of MCOs. 29 Guidance on "managing" managed care is
now available from a wide variety of sources. 30 Even judicial opinions have
laws of supply and demand and that market will solve problems).
27. SeeJohn K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Rapid Changesfor Academic Medical
Centers, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1391, 1393-94 (1994) (describing adverse consequences for academic medical centers as a result of growth of managed care);
Jerome P. Kassirer, Academic Medical Centers Under Siege, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1370,
1371 (1994) (same); Joan Beck, Medical Research Succumbing to Managed Care, BALriMORE SUN, July 24, 1997, at 15A (describing faltering clinical research as result of
managed care); Ron Winslow, Heart Research Hurt by Funding Cuts, Managed Care
Growth, Scientists Say, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1996, at B4 (arguing that growth of managed care and lack of public financing for research and teaching has resulted in
less research and consolidation of health care system).
28. Peter Buerhaus & Douglas Staiger, Managed Care and the Nurse Workforce,
276 JAMA 1487, 1487 (1996) (discussing widely held perception that spread of
managed care has caused increase in nurse workloads, decrease in credentials of
those providing care and overall decline in quality of patient care); Esther B. Fein,
Cost-Cutting by Hospitals to Accelerate, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1996, at BI (noting that
hospitals are restructuring their operations in response to low levels of reimbursement); Abby Goodnough, Small Pharmacies Squeezed by the Health Care Revolution,
N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 28, 1996, at 13NJ6 (noting that small pharmacies are squeezed by
MCOs and drug companies); Julie Miller, Pharmacies in A Struggle for Survival, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1995, at 13CN1 (same); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Once in Big Demand,
Nurses Are Targetfor Hospital Cuts, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1996, at BI (describing how
hospitals are firing nurses in response to low reimbursement from MCOs and
nurses' complaints about effect of such practices on quality of care).

29. See Philip M. Nudelman & Linda M. Andrews, The "Value Added" of Not-forProfit Health Plans, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1057, 1058 (1996) (criticizing for-profit
HMOs for spending 20%-30% on administration, marketing and dividends, leaving much less to be spent on health care needs of community); Church, supra note
9, at 33-35 (cataloguing complaints); Ron Winslow, HMOJuggernaut: U.S. Healthcare Cuts Costs, Grows Rapidly and Irks Some Doctors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1994, at Al
(noting that president of U.S. Healthcare made $21.2 million while doctors are
being squeezed). But see Malik M. Hasan, Let's End the Nonprofit Charade,334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1055, 1055 (1996) (arguing that critics of for-profit health care are all
wet); David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability: Reassessing Tax Exemption for
Hospitals, 15 Am. J. L. & MED. 327, 357-80 (1990) [hereinafter Hyman, Conundrum
of Charitability] (reviewing arguments for and against nonprofit hospitals); David A.
Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact Fantasy and Regulatory Follies, 23J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 4-11, on file with author) (noting that argument that
nonprofit hospitals are especially virtuous is problematic at best); David J. Fine,
Adam Smith, George Orwell, and the Contemporary Hospital 12 FRONTIERs HEALTH SERV.
MGMT. 43, 44 (1996) ("[T]he management and governance values necessary for
success in the managed care-oriented marketplace produce a trend line that is
bringing the critical success factors of tax-paying and tax-exempt institutions closer
together. They may well soon be indistinguishable.").
30. See, e.g., Karen Cheney, How to Be a Managed Care Winner, MONEY, July
1997, at 122 (collecting advice on how to deal with managed care plans); Tessa
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taken note of the changes in the medical marketplace.

III.

THE CONSUMER PROTECTION RESPONSE TO MANAGED CARE

Although some MCOs recognized that there was public dissatisfaction
with their operations, they proved remarkably ineffective in defending
their policies and procedures. 3 2 Among other strategies, MCOs responded with denials that the specified conduct was occurring, surveys indicating high levels of satisfaction among their customers, defenses of
certain practices, and for some issues, grudging capitulation. 3 3 After several losses in the public relations war, the managed care trade organization announced the adoption of nonbinding guidelines intended to
DeCarlo, Making Managed Care Work for You, GLAMOUR, Sept. 1996, at 286 (same);
Michael S. Z. Gurland & Eugene R. Anderson, How to Make Your H. MO. Blink, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at 3:15 (same); Perri Klass, Managing Managed Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at 6:72 (cataloguing suggestions for improving managed care);
see also ViKRAM KHANNA, MANAGED CARE MADE EASY: SURVIVAL IN THE HMO ERA
(1997) ("Managed Care Made Easy will help you understand and deal with all the
angles in managed care, from restrictions on the kinds of prescription drugs you
can use, to the limited lists of doctors and hospitals you can choose from.").
31. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 265
F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1994) ("From a short-term financial standpoint the
HMO's incentive is to keep you healthy if it can but if you get very sick, and are
unlikely to recover to a healthy state involving few medical expenses, to let you die
as quickly and as cheaply as possible."); Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth,
946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302 (D. Mich. 1996), affd without written opinion, 121 F.3d 708
(6th Cir. 1997) ("In the real world, hospitals are in the business of saving lives, and
managed care organizations are in the business of saving dollars.").
32. See Kassirer, supra note 9, at 338. Dr. Kassirer has noted a range of responses by managed care organizations:
Some in the managed-care industry have blamed their bad reputation on
their own failings; they say that they have not tried hard enough to explain how they add value, that they have not been aggressive enough in
responding to criticism, and that they have not taken time to talk to local
reporters. Some have blamed the press, claiming that journalists are confused about the differences between HMOs, hospitals, and physician
groups and that they are not interested in writing about managed care's
success. Some even claim there has been an organized effort by other
health care players to attack managed care. Still others would have us
believe that their image problem is only semantic.
Id.
33. See, e.g., Laura Johannes, Managed-Care Group Softens View on Hospital Stays
After Mastectomies, WALL ST.J., Nov. 14, 1996 at B6 (noting that MCO trade organization adopted policy urging its members not to deny hospital stays following mastectomies; new policy "aimed at defusing rising criticism of health maintenance
organizations that have been making unpopular coverage decisions in their efforts
to control costs");Johannes, supra note 21, at B8 (noting that MCO reversed outpatient mastectomy policy "largely in recognition of the 'emotional issues' involved
in the surgery. 'Some battlesjust aren't worth fighting."'); David R. Olmos & Shari
Roan, HMO "Gag Clauses" on Doctors Spur Protest, L.A. TIMES, April 14, 1996, at Al
(noting that MCOs denied that there was any such thing as a gag clause, but "some
major health plans have scrambled to remove the controversial language from physician contracts.").
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ensure that MCOs were "putting patients first."3 4 Some MCOs have bro35
ken ranks and sought to broker deals directly with their critics.
Legislators have rushed to respond to the complaints outlined above.
A deluge of bills, laws and regulations resulted.3 6 The "motherhood and
apple pie" nature of such legislation is neatly demonstrated by the titles of
a number of these initiatives; who could in good conscience oppose the
Hippocratic Oath and Patient Protection Act,3 7 the Health Insurance Bill
of Rights Act,3 8 the Patient Right to Know Act 3 9 or the Patient Access to
Responsible Care Act?4 0 The desire to "do something" about the "excesses" of managed care is bipartisan; even conservative Republicans are
"castigating private enterprise in tones that would make Ralph Nader
41
proud."
34. See American Ass'n of Health Plans, Putting PatientsFirst (visited Mar. 1,
1998) <http://www.aahp.org/services/_initiatives/patients-first/putting-patients
_first.htm> (discussing "Putting Patients First, [which is] a comprehensive, longterm initiative ... designed to improve communication with patients and physicians and streamline administrative procedures"); Ron Winslow, Medicine: Managed Care Acts to Mollify Clients, Doctors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1996, at BI (discussing
MCOs' strategy). For a more extensive description of the philosophy behind the
"Putting Patients First" initiative, along with a variety of more and less skeptical
responses, see Bruce E. Bradley, PuttingPatientsFirstHelps Business, 16 HEALTH Arr.
121, 121 (1997) (arguing AAHP initiative is good business); Clark C. Havighurst,
"PuttingPatients First": Promise or Smoke Screen?, 16 HEALTH Arr. 123, 123 (1997)
(criticizing AAHP initiative because it precludes coverage diversity and increases
cost of coverage); William F. Jessee, Reed V. Tuckson & Linda L. Emanuel, Going
Beyond a "Philosophyof Care," 16 HEALTH AFr. 126, 126 (1997) (noting alternative
strategies for improving quality of health care); David A. Jones, Putting Patients
First: A Philosophy in Practice,16 HEALTH AFr. 115, 115 (1997) (describing AAHP
intiative); Peter V. Lee, The True Test of Whether Health Plans Put PatientsFirst, 16
HEALTH Arr. 129, 129 (1997) (criticizing AAHP initiative for ignoring main
problems with managed care); see also Kassirer, supra note 9, at 338 ("Putting Patients First may be a laudable start at setting industry norms, but the paucity of
clear, strong standards and the absence of rigorous enforcement methods leave
one with the impression that the emphasis on patient protection is not entirely
sincere.").
35. See Robert Pear, Three Big Health PlansJoin in Call for National Standards,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, at Al ("Three big health maintenance organizations
joined two consumer groups today in calling for more regulation of managed
health care, saying all health plans should be subject to 'legally enforceable national standards.'").
36. For a discussion of the range of proposed and enacted legislation, see
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
37. See H.R. 3222, 104th Cong. (1996).
38. S. 373, 105th Cong. (1997).
39. H.R. 2976, 104th Cong. (1996).
40. H.R. No. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
41. See Romesh Ratnesar, Bad Medicine, NEw REPUBLIC July 7, 1997, at 10
("Something was strange about this Capitol Hill press conference. Here were Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato and Republican Congressman Charlie Norwood introducing 'The Patient Access to Responsible Care Act,' and castigating
private enterprise in tones that would make Ralph Nader proud."); see also
Freudenheim, Baby Boomers, supra note 9, at C2 ("Senators and Congressmen in
both parties are backing federal laws, including a proposal that would make it
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In short order, a clear majority of the states adopted some version of
consumer protection legislation. 42 Ballot initiatives in California and Oregon that would have placed significant restrictions on managed care were
defeated in 1996. 4 3 The National Association of Insurance Commissioneasier to sue health plans for medical malpractice .... "); Kent Jenkins, Jr. et al.,
Health Care Politics: The Sequel, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 1997, at 22 (noting bipartisan support for federal regulation of HMOs and health insurers); Passell, supra note 9, at 4:4 ("Congress is flooded with similar ad hoc proposals from
both sides of the aisle-including one from that stalwart of Republicanism, Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato of New York."); Richard Perez-Pena, Lieutenant Governor
Breaks with Party on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at B6 (noting that New York
Lieutenant Governor Betsey McCaughey Ross backed Democratic state senators
who "tried to force vote on bill she wrote that would require insurers to cover some
experimental medical treatments"); Marge Roukema, Medicine Degraded by the "Bottom Line, "WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1997, at A15 (urging Congress to pass various consumer protections to ensure women and their doctors are not "dictated to by
insurance companies in contradiction of accepted medical practice").
42. The practical significance of legislation at the state level is limited by preemption of laws that "relate to" self-funded ERISA plans and the number of people
in programs that fall outside the ambit of state insurance regulations, such as
Medicare and Medicaid. The General Accounting Office explained that
[b]ecause employer health plans are generally beyond the scope of state
authority, states consider ERISA a major obstacle to their ability to effectively manage their health care markets .... [R]oughly 114 million individuals are covered by ERISA health plans. In most of these ERISA plans,
the employer purchases health care coverage from a third-party insurer
that is subject to state insurance regulation and insurance premium taxation. But for nearly 40% of these plans, covering about 44 million people, the employer chooses to self-fund and retain the risk for its health
plans. Because these self-funded plans are not deemed to be insurance,
ERISA preempts them from state regulation and premium taxation.
GENERAL AccOUNTINC OFFICE, GAO HEHS-95-167, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 1-3 (1995); see alsoJohn K.
Iglehart, State Regulation of Managed Care: NAIC President Josephine Musser, 16
HEALTH AFF. 36, 39 (1997) (stating that "in essence, state insurance departments
regulate about one-third of the health insurance coverage in an average state");
Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1986, 1987 (1997) (discussing extent of
ERISA preemption and impact on state consumer protection regulation).
The precise boundary of ERISA preemption has been a hot issue since the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). See Stuart Auerbach, Law
GuardingHMOs from Suit Challenged; PatientsFind Doctors Easier to Sue, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 1996, at Z08; Mariner, supra, at 1987-89.
43. See David R. Olmos, Foes of 2 HMO Bills Say They Would CostJobs, L.A. TIMES,
July 25, 1996, at 2 (describing California initiatives and their potential economic
consequences); Eric Schine, In California, Its "Hell No, HMO," Bus. WK., May 20,
1996, at 38 (describing complaints that led to California initiatives); Vincent J.
Schodolski, Alleged HMO Abuses Spur California Ballot Issues, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13,
1996, at 1 (describing California initiatives). The initiatives in Oregon would have
required MCOs to accept any willing provider and prohibited the use of capitation.
See Matthew K. Wynia, The Oregon CapitationInitiative: Lessons and Warnings,from the
Forefront of the Backlash, 276 JAMA 1441, 1441-42 (1996). Both ballot initiatives
were unsuccessful. See Church, supra note 9, at 35.
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ers has developed model legislation for regulating MCOs.44 The states
45
remain a hotbed of consumer protection regulation and legislation.
Congress and the executive branch of the federal government have been
busy in the area as well. 46 The President's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care System ("President's
Commission") has just completed drafting a "bill of rights" for patients,
47
which President Clinton has enthusiastically endorsed.
44. See NAIC Adopts Model Laws on Quality, Credentialing,MANAGED CARE WK.,
June 10, 1996 (outlining NAIC's model legislation). For a more general perspective on the NAIC's role, see Iglehart, supra note 42, at 36.
45. For a discussion of consumer protection legislation, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., The Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, S. 373, H.R. 820,
105th Cong.; Managed Care Consumer Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 337, 105th
Cong.; Patient Protection Act of 1997, S. 346, 105th Cong.; Quality Health Care
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1222, 105th Cong. (1997); Patient Access to
Responsible Care Act, S. 644, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
At least one important group (congressional staffers) are convinced that such
legislation is urgently required. See CongressFeels PressureMountingfor Managed Care
Reform (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://home.patientaccess.com/pac/wirthlin.html>
(reporting survey of congressional staffers finding overwhelming support for federal regulation of managed care). The executive branch is of like mind, and has
proposed its own reforms. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Requirements
for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 42 C.F.R. pt.
417, 434 (1996) (prohibiting certain incentive payments); Robert Pear, Clinton Prohibits H.M.O. Limit on Advice to Medicaid Patients,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1997, at A22
(noting new prohibition on gag clauses); Robert Pear, U.S. Issues Rules for HMO's in
an Effort to Protect Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at B8 (describing rules enacted to protect patients by restricting managed care incentives to doctors). The
Health Care Financing Administration's final regulations, which would have prohibited certain incentive payments to physicians, were withdrawn almost immediately after they were issued. See Robert Pear, U.S. Shelves Plan to Limit Rewards to
H.M.O. Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1996, at Al.
47. SeeJenkins et al., supra note 41, at 22 (noting Clinton administration's
support for federal regulation of HMOs and health insurers); The Rights of Patients,
by Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A28 (noting that Clinton has backed patient
"bill of rights"); Amy Goldstein, Clinton to Propose Patients' Rights Bill, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 1997, at Al (same); Robert Pear, Clinton Plans New Health Care Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at Al8 (same); Robert Pear, Panel of Experts Urges Broadening
of PatientsRights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at Al (describing report of advisory
commission). For the complete text of the proposed Bill of Rights, see President's
Advisory Comm'n on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Indus.,
Message from the Commission (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov>.
The title of the Commission, the President's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, is worthy of note because it does not reflect any acknowledgment of the economic implications of
consumer protection or quality. The charter of the President's Commission does
indicate that one of its functions is to "recommend measures as may be necessary
to promote and assure health care quality and value," but the debates of the Commissioners generally excluded discussion of economic matters. Id. The Bill of
Rights and Responsibilities issued by the President's Commission also reflects in its
guiding principles that "[c]osts matter," but "[q]uality comes first." See President's
Advisory Comm'n on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Indus.,
Chapter Eight: Consumer Responsibilities (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.hcqual-
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A complete review of these efforts would be outdated well before this
article appeared. 48 Accordingly, this Article provides an abbreviated over-

view of regulatory activity in the area, but makes no attempt to be comprehensive. For analytical purposes, regulation of managed care can be
usefully divided into two broad categories: provisions that affect the relationship between health care providers and MCOs ("Type I"), and provisions that affect the relationship between health care providers or insurers

and patients, including the scope of covered services ("Type II").49
A.

Type I Legislation (Health Care Provider/MCONexus)

The paradigm of Type I legislation is an "any willing provider" statute.
Although there are a number of variants ("freedom of choice,"
"mandatory admittance," "due process" and "essential community provider"), all such statutes constrain the ability of MCOs to freely enter into
(and exit from) contracts with health care providers. 50 Because selective
contracting with providers is one of the core principles of managed care,
such statutes are understandably viewed as antimanaged care.5 1 Other less
ity-commission.gov/cborr/chap8ack.htm#headl>.
48. For a discussion of the rate of legislative change, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text. Those who wish a more issue-specific approach can contact
The National Conference of State Legislatures' Health Policy Tracking Service,
which provides quarterly updates on the activities of each of the 50 states through
a variety of issue briefs. A complete set of these issue briefs is available on the
Internet, for the modest sum of $995 at http://www.hpts.org. The same organization maintains an Internet-based Health Policy Tracking Service, which is more
frequently updated and costs considerably more.
49. Some provisions do not fit neatly into this framework, such as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. § 1320a-7b). Although consumers might
well benefit from such provisions, such legislation is not really aimed at problems
created by the growth of managed care.
50. See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REvIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

app. D (1995) (review of state any willing provider laws); Gary A. Francesconi,
ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing Provider" Laws-An Essential Step Toward National
Health Care Reform, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 227, 231 (1995) (providing overview of statutes); Fred J. Hellinger, Any-Willing Provider and Freedom-Of-Choice Laws: An Economic Assessment, 14 HEALTH AFF. 297, 297 (1995) ("In recent years the prerogative
of managed care plans to selectively contract with health care providers to establish
networks of preferred providers has been circumscribed in many states through
the enactment of any-willing-provider (AWP) and freedom-of-choice (FOC)
laws.").
51. SeeJames W. Childs, Jr., You May Be Willing, But Are You Able?: A Critical
Analysis of "Any Willing Provider"Legislation, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 199, 200 (1997). Mr.
Childs noted that
[v]irtually every legal scholar who has addressed the issue and all proponents of managed care attack [any willing provider] legislation as an attempt by politically powerful interest groups in the medical community to
protect their current income levels and jobs at the risk of significantly
increasing the cost of health care and completely unraveling the optimal
combination of cost control and quality that managed care has achieved.
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extreme versions of Type I legislation include prohibitions on "gag" and
"hold-harmless" clauses, and restrictions on the use of various systems of
compensation, including bonuses, hold-backs and capitation.
Although many of the states have adopted some form of Type I legis52
lation, enthusiasm for global any willing provider provisions has waned.
Due process provisions, however, remain popular, as do prohibitions on
gag clauses and restrictions on the use of compensation mechanisms that
53
At the federal
create an incentive for the withholding of necessary care.
level, gag clauses and inappropriate incentive mechanisms were prohibited in the Medicare managed care market, but more global legislation has
54
been repeatedly stalled.
B.

Type II (Health Care Provideror Insurer/PatientNexus)

"Type II" legislation includes a diverse group of consumer protections, such as direct access to specialists, provider disclosure of compensation arrangements, mandated coverage of certain treatments (for
example, forty-eight-hour stay postpartum and emergency department
(ED) services where a prudent layperson would have sought such care)
and expedited external appeals of all claim denials. 55 Each of these issues
has attracted a following at the state level. At the federal level, a prohibition on drive-through deliveries was adopted with overwhelming bipartisan support, but broader legislation has been stalled. At both the federal
52. At least some of the explanation for this decline in broad any willing provider legislation has been the tendency of courts to find that such legislation is
preempted by ERISA. See, e.g., CIGNA Healthplan v. Louisiana ex rel. Ieyoub, 82
F.3d 642, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding Louisiana's any willing provider statute preempted by ERISA); Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr. Inc., 964 F.
Supp. 1285, 1299 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (holding Arkansas' any willing provider statute
preempted); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Atlanta v. Nielsen, 917 F. Supp. 1532,
1537 (1996) (holding Alabama's any willing provider statute preempted).
Narrower provisions have met with greater success. See Texas Pharmacy Ass'n
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 1035, 1040-42 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding narrow any
willing provider legislation for pharmacists not preempted by ERISA, but subsequent broadening amendment results in preemption); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v.
Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500, 503-04 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding Virginia's any willing provider statute regulates the business of insurance and escapes
ERISA preemption).
53. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1103-07 (discussing restrictions on financial
incentives, gag clauses and provisions to ensure continuity of care).
54. For a discussion of the current status of consumer protection legislation,
see supra notes 9, 42 and 47 and accompanying text.
55. One should distinguish between consumer protections aimed at the patient-provider relationship (Type Ila) and consumer protections aimed at the patient-insurer relationship (Type Ilb). In many instances, managed care has
effectively combined the provider and insurer function, and thus these issues are
treated together for purposes of this article. However, no implication is intended,
nor should any be drawn with regard to other issues, such as whether the coverage
decisions of the insurer constitute the unlicensed practice of medicine, or whether
the medical director of an insurer is subject to discipline by the state medical licensing board.
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and state levels, there has been a distinct movement away from issue-specific Type I and Type II legislation toward more global statutory
56
frameworks.
IV. A

CASE STUDY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION:

EMERGENCY MEDICINE

AND MANAGED CARE

Both Type I and Type II legislation are quite remarkable because the
doctor-patient relationship has historically been subject to little or no direct regulation. To the extent that there was any regulatory oversight, the
state controlled who could practice medicine and, to a considerably lesser
extent, the scope of their authority. There was little occasion to regulate
the doctor-insurer and patient-insurer relationship. The general assess-

ment was that statutory micromanagement was unlikely to lead to optimal
results, and patients were safe-or at least safe enough in the hands of
their health care providers. A substantial incidence of problems did little
57
to dampen this assessment-at least until the arrival of managed care.
However, as Part III reflects, the last few years have seen an extraordinary
outpouring of such consumer protection legislation.
The standard explanation of these developments is that they represent an understandable and reasonable response by state and federal legislators to the complaints outlined in Part II. Consumers must be protected,
and the managed care industry has shown no indications it can police its
own ranks. In response, there is now a clear and popular "impulse toward
58
regulation"-preferably at the federal level.
This optimistic picture glosses over some critical issues. First, the proponents of consumer protection lack a consistent theory explaining and
justifying their efforts. 59 Absent such a theory, one is left with only gut
56. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 1102 ("In 1995-1996, state governments
started to take a more comprehensive approach, establishing policies on a wide
array of issues"). Even the proponents of consumer protection have indicated
their unwillingness to continue legislating by body part. SeeEqual Time: Advantages
and Disadvantages of HMOs and Ways to Reform the Health-Care System (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 14, 1997) (transcript on file with author) (comments of Ron
Pollack, President of Families USA) ("Now I don't think that the best way to do this
is piece by piece, limb by limb, procedure by procedure. And we've been doing
a-a bit of that. I think we need to do something more basic than that.").
57. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy andPrivacy: ProtectingPatientsfrom Their
Physicians, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291, 291-92 (1994) (cataloguing problems); see also

M.D. Smith, Managed Care and the Poor, 5J.

HEALTH CARE POOR UNDERSERVE

147,

147 (1994) (observing that "nothing is worse than fee-for-service").
58. Donald W. Moran, FederalRegulation of Managed Care: An Impulse in Search
of a Theory, 16 HEALTH Arr. 7, 8 (1997).
59. See id. As Mr. Moran has noted,
[a] Ithough forceful arguments have been made to support specific regulatory interventions, no advocate of federal regulation has laid out a
framework that permits us to see where federal regulation of the health
benefits industry may ultimately lead. This state of affairs is unusual. Advocates of regulation in most industries bend over backward to justify regulatory interventions by appealing to a comprehensive theory of
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instincts, bad anecdotes and popular appeal to assess the merits of the
proposed reforms. The combination of these elements can easily result in
misdirected regulatory initiatives. 60 Second, many of the problems that
have been identified are far more complex than has been commonly acknowledged. 61 Third, the proposed reforms suffer from their own inadequacies, even without factoring in the (usually carefully ignored)
economic implications. 62 Finally, the drafting of consumer protection initiatives is readily hijacked by providers, who have their own interests at
heart.

63

regulation. The rationale typically proceeds from a diagnosis of 'market
failure'-that is, that the unfettered free market, left to its own devices,
would produce socially suboptimal results because of specific structural
flaws in the way the market works. The regulatory regime being advanced is then typically characterized as the lowest-cost intervention in
the marketplace sufficient to remedy the identified defects and produce
results closer to the desired optimal outcome.
Id.
60. See Jerome Kassirer, PracticingMedicine Without a License-The New Intrusions by Congress, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1747, 1747 (1997) [hereinafter Kassirer,
PracticingMedicine]. Dr. Kassirer commented that
Congress is not the appropriate forum for making complex medical decisions ...

the data on which many important medical decisions are based

are often contradictory and still in evolution. Legislators do not have the
context nor the capacity to weigh medical evidence adequately ....

Not

only are complexity, lack of context, and expertise an issue, but legislators frequently respond politically to the emotional appeals of their constituents. (How could health-maintenance organizations insist on
sending tired-out moms home in 24 hours? How could insurance companies deny lifesaving mammography to women? How could a grisly abortion method be condoned?) This is decision making by emotional and
opportunistic consensus, not by studied, thoughtful reasoning, based on
evidence.
Id. Not surprisingly, these circumstances result in bad legislation. See Kassirer,
supra note 9, at 338 ("The potential impact of this legislation varies widely; some
bills would protect the public, some could go too far in requiring benefits and
potentially cripple the health insurance industry, and some would abrogate physicians' authority to practice medicine").
61. For example, mandated post-partum coverage and mammography screening are politically popular, but the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine
noted that
[r]equiring health plans to pay for up to 48 hours of hospital care makes
little sense when there is meager evidence of actual benefit in prolonging
the stay for the new mother and baby. Offering firm recommendations
for mammography for women in their forties is irrational when the profession itself is conflicted and confused about the procedure's value.
Kassirer, PracticingMedicine, supra note 60, at 1747.
62. See Moran, supra note 58, at 20 ("The dilemma for public policy is that the
sort of regulatory tools we have do not match up well against the essence of the
problem that any meaningful policy needs to address.").
63. See David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection (?), Managed Care, and the Emergency Department, in ACHIEVING QUALITY IN MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE OF LAw 57,
65 (1997); Robert L. Roth, Anti-Managed Care Laws: Patient Protectionor ProviderSelfInterest, in HEALTH LAw HANDBOOK 163, 163-66 (1997). Those who wonder
whether the debate is about consumer protection or provider protection and
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Such arguments can be made on a purely theoretical plane, but an
example provides concrete evidence on these points. Consider access to
emergency care, which has become a flash-point issue for discontent about
managed care. 6 4 Almost any discussion of consumer protection and managed care results in some anecdotes about a terrible outcome that could
have been averted had the MCO only authorized a visit to the ED, or people who were stuck with a large bill for an unauthorized visit to an ED for
what they believed was an emergency, but turned out not to be. 65 In reprofit should examine the reaction to the proposal to capitate specialty care. Capitation shifts financial risk to physicians, but gives them increased control over
treatment decisions. Not surprisingly, some physician groups were opposed, and
complained that "lower quality care will result." Elisabeth Rosenthal, Reduced
H.M.O. Fees Cause Concern About Patient Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at Al; see
also Arnold S. Relman & Uwe Reinhardt, An Exchange on For-ProfitHealth Care, in
FoR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 209, 211-12 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1986).

Reinhardt cuttingly observed that
[s] urely you will agree that it has been one of American medicine's more
hallowed tenets that piece-rate compensation is the sine qua non of high
quality medical care. Think about this tenet. We have here a profession
that openly professes that its members are unlikely to do their best unless
they are rewarded in cold cash for every little ministration rendered their
patients. If an economist made that assertion, one might write it off as
one more of that profession's kooky beliefs. But physicians are saying it!
Id.
64. See Loren A. Johnson & Robert W. Derlet, Conflicts Between Managed Care
Organizations and Emergency Departments in California, 164 W. J. MED. 137, 137-40
(1996) (discussing MCOs' practice of restricting use of EDs by their enrollees, refusing to pay for unnecessary treatment and use of varying standards for determining necessary treatment); Harold H. Osborn, Health Maintenance Organizations:
Managed Care or Mismanaged Care?, 27 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 225, 225-26 (1996)
(recounting episode where MCO denied coverage of ED visit and child was subsequently diagnosed with meningitis and stating "[u]nfortunately, this is not an isolated case of (mis) managed care but one of a growing number indicating serious
problems with efforts to reorganize our health care system"); Pear, supra note 1, at
Al (noting that MCOs "are increasingly denying claims for care provided in emergency rooms," causing "obstacles to emergency care for ... patients" and frustrating emergency room doctors "who say [MCO] practices discourage patients from
seeking urgently needed care"); Lori Sham, ER Battle of the Bill; Insurers, Patients
Often Clash over Who Pays, USA ToDAY, Aug. 22, 1995, at 1 (stating that based on
analysis of claims handled by Emergency Physicians Billing Service in Oklahoma
City, "[some plans deny less than 1% of emergency room claims as non-authorized or non-urgent, while other plans deny 15% or more ....

Some plans are

denying two to three times as many claims as other plans at the same hospital").
The problem is complicated by the fact that
[e]ach H.M.O. seems to have its own way of handling emergencies.
Large plans like Kaiser Permanente provide a full range of 24-hour emergency services at their own clinics and hospitals. Some H.M.O.'s have
nurses to advise patients over the telephone. Some H.M.O. doctors take
phone calls from patients at night. Some leave answering-machine
messages telling patients to go to hospital emergency rooms if they cannot wait until office hours.
Pear, supra note 1, at Al.
65. See Serafini, supra note 9, at 2280-83 (discussing anecdotes of patients refusing to be seen in ED if they thought visit would not be covered by their MCO);
Church, supra note 9, at 32 (noting "recent addition" to litany of horror stories
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sponse, almost thirty states have enacted laws in this area, and a variety of
bills are pending in other states. 66 Similar federal provisions cover the
about managed care is when "a patient rushes to an emergency room with what

feels like a heart attack but turns out to be only gas pains-and gets zapped with a
huge bill because his HMO will reimburse only for a 'real' emergency"). In a few
isolated cases, anecdotes about claim denials when there was a true emergency
have been offered. See Gregory L. Henry, Require HMO's to Provide Emergency Care,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at A26 ("In one case, a claim filed on behalf of a Detroit
women who died of sudden cardiac arrest was denied because she did not call for
permission before seeking emergency care."). The overwhelming majority of
anecdotes about coverage denial, however, involve the two variations in the text.
66. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-821, -923, -1068, -1137, -2801 to -2804
(West Supp. 1996) (regulating medical service corporations); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-9-309 (Michie Supp. 1996) (creating Emergency Medical Care Act, which ensures that necessary emergency care be provided in timely manner, regardless of
patients' ability to pay); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.4 (Deering Supp.
1996) (enumerating requirements that MCOs must comply with, including providing 24-hour access for enrollees to obtain authorization for treatment, reimbursement for emergency services and care and authority to deny payment under
certain circumstances); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.513 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
MCOs from, among other things, requiring prior authorization for emergency
care and indicating that emergencies are covered only if care is secured within a
set time); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-11-80 to -82 (1996) (creating emergency services
law that imposes duty on hospitals to treat all patients who present themselves,
regardless of ability to pay); id. §§ 33-20A-1 to -10, 33-21-1, -13, -18 (enacting Patient Protection Act, which prohibits MCOs from using financial incentive programs "that directly compensate[ ] a health care provider for ordering or
providing less than medically necessary and appropriate care"); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 22:2018(D)(1) (West 1995) (governing terms of contracts between MCOs
and providers); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II §§ 19-705.1(b), -712.5, -716
(Supp. 1996) (setting forth minimum standard of quality care to be provided by
MCOs to their members); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4300 (Michie Supp. 1996) (defining requirements placed on MCOs); W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-8d (Supp. 1996) (requiring that all those covered by act shall "provide as benefits to all subscribers and
members coverage for emergency services").
Some states have addressed the issue through regulations. See MINN. R.
4685.1010 (1996) (setting forth requirements for availability and accessibility of
health care services); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 119.51, .52 (West 1996) (stating that
MCOs shall provide accessible physician coverage to enrollees 24 hours per day);
id. § 3.3704 (prohibiting health insurance policies from requiring that service be
rendered by particular health care provider).
A number of state legislatures have also proposed bills on the issue. See, e.g.,
H.B. 1122, 61st Leg., 1st Sess. (Colo. 1997) (enacting "consumer protection standards for the operation of managed care plans"); H.B. 6883, 1997 Leg., 1st Sess.
(Conn. 1997) (requiring MCOs to, among other things, report to state regarding
complaints for denials of coverage); S. 209, 144th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ga. 1997)
(amending law relating to emergency medicine "so as to provide that no insurer
... may deny coverage of certain emergency procedures"); S. 984, 19th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Haw. 1997) (enacting law governing health insurance providers); S. 1150,
54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 1997) (same); H.B. 626, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 1997)
(same); S. 204, 77th Leg., 1st Sess. (Kan. 1997) (amending law governing health
insurance providers); H.B. 2206, 1997 Leg., 1st Sess, (La. 1997) (amending emergency care law to prohibit "pre-certification [requirement] for an emergency medical condition"); S. 960, 80th Leg., 1st Sess. (Minn. 1997) (enacting law providing
for patient protection with regard to health insurance providers); H.B. 335, 89th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1997) (same); S. 365, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mont. 1997) ("An

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43: p. 409

Medicare and Medicaid populations, and Congress is considering various

67
bills that would extend these protections to the rest of the population.
The President's Commission has made it clear that a consumer's "bill of
rights" would include a provision on this issue. 68 The Physician Payment
Review Commission and the National Center for Quality Assurance came

Act providing for the regulation of health insurance carriers who offer managed
care plans"); H.R. 279, 95th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1997) (enacting Managed Care
Patient Protection Act, establishing standards and requirements for health carriers
offering health care plans); H.R. 521, 69th Leg., 1st Sess. (Nev. 1997) (making
changes to and improving upon existing health insurance laws); H.B. 7553, 219th
Leg., 2d Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (same); S. 932, 1997 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.C. 1997) (amending laws governing health benefit plans to improve operations of MCOs); S. 67,
122d Leg., 1st Sess. (Ohio 1997) (same); S. 1182, 69th Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 1997)
(creating act relating to managed care organizations); S. 100, 181st Leg., 1st Sess.
(Pa. 1997) (providing "for the certification of managed care health benefits plans,"
requiring disclosures to enrollees and providing access to health care services for
patients); S. 383, 75th Leg., 1st Sess, (Tex. 1997) (amending law governing preferred provider benefit plans); H.B. 2018, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Wash. 1997) (seting forth act relating to health insurance reform).
67. See, e.g., The Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, S. 373, H.R. 820,
105th Cong. Each of the global reform bills pending before Congress includes a
provision which addresses the issue. In addition, two free-standing bills, Access to
Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, H.R. 815, 105th Cong. (1997) and Access
to Emergency Medical Services Act of 1997, S. 356, 105th Cong. (1997) are directed at the issue.
68. See President's Advisory Comm'n on Consumer Protection & Quality in
the Health Care Indus., Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities:Report to the President of the United States (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://hcqualitycommission.gov/
cborr/consbill.htm>. The President's Commission drafted a consumer bill of
rights with eight provisions. Under the third provision,
[c]onsumers have the right to access emergency health care services
when and where the need arises. Health plans should provide payment
when a consumer presents to an emergency department with acute symptoms of sufficient severity-including severe pain-such that a "prudent
layperson" could reasonably expect the absence of medical attention to
result in placing their health in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to
bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
To ensure this right:
Health plans should educate their members about the availability, location, and appropriate use of emergency and other medical services;
cost-sharing provisions for emergency services; and the availability of
care outside an emergency department.
Health plans using a defined network of providers should cover emergency department screening and stabilization services both in network
and out of network without prior authorization for use consistent with
the prudent layperson standard. Non-network providers and facilities
should not bill patients for any charges in excess of health plans' routine payment arrangements.
Emergency department personnel should contact a patient's primary
care provider or health plan, as appropriate, as quickly as possible to
discuss follow-up and post-stabilization care and promote continuity of
care.
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to the same conclusion.6

9

429

Academic commentators and editorial writers

have hailed these initiatives. 70

Even the managed care industry has effec-

tively conceded the fight. 7 1 Unfortunately, the resulting reforms make
plain the difficulties facing those who would craft a legislative response to
such problems. A full appreciation of the complexities of this issue requires some background on ED utilization, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA")

72

and cost-quality trade-offs in

the health insurance market.
A.

ED Overview

EDs, which range in sophistication, staffing and resources, are a major component of the American health care system. For uninsured Americans and those covered by Medicaid, the ED has historically been the
primary means of access to health care. 73 For insured Americans, the ED
provides around-the-clock access to sophisticated diagnostic and treatment
69. See Physician Payment Review Commission, Medicare's and Health Plan's
Coverage Decisions and The Appeals Process, in ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 136
(1996); 1997 SURVEYOR GUIDELINES FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

UM4 (National Comm. for Quality Assurance).

70. See, e.g., Too Many HMOs Stint on Emergency-Room Care, USA TODAY, Apr. 9,
1997, at 10A ("Few health mandates, especially those that second-guess health-care
professionals, make sense. But requiring an industry to do its job-in this case, to
care for and cover people in need of medical attention-is neither picayune nor
meddlesome. It is the right thing-the best thing-to do.").
Academic commentary has been equally. favorable. See Diane E. Hoffman,
Emergency Care and Managed Care-A Dangerous Combination, 72 WASH. L. REv. 315,
406-07 (1997); ChristopherJ. Young, Emergency! Says Who? Analysis of the Legal Issues
ConcerningManaged Care and Emergency MedicalServices, 13J. CONTEMP HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 553, 554 (1997). Dissenting notes are rare. See Hyman, supra note 63, at 59;
John C. Goodman, Government Has No Role, USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 1997, at 10A ("The
proper role of government is to make sure insurers keep their promises and don't
defraud or cheat us. It should help low-income families pay premiums they can't
pay on their own. Beyond that, the free market should decide.").
71. See Jones, supra note 34, at 119; see also Health Plans Vote to Require PatientCentered Policies for Membership in AAHP (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://
www.aahp.org/services/prupdate/patients-first/prinst.html>
(discussing "policies... to clarify how health plans should cover emergency care").
72. Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 164 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(1994)).
73. See Kenneth V. Iserson & Tammy Kaystre, Are Emergency Departments Really
a "Safety Net"for the Medically Indigent, 14 Am. J. EMERGENCY MED. 1, 1 (1996)
(describing function of ED as providing treatment "for those with threats to life or
limb, but also 'for those individuals whose health needs are less urgent but for
whom the ED may be the only entry point into the broader health care system.'"
(quoting American College of Emergency Physicians, Emergency Care Guidelines, 20
ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1389-95 (1991))); Medicaid Access Group, Access of Medicaid Recipients to Outpatient Care, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1426, 1430 (1994) (noting
that many poor people have nowhere else to go other than ED); Robert S. Stern et
al., The Emergency Department as a Pathway to Admission for Poor and High-Cost Patients,
266 JAMA 2238, 2238 (1991) ("[P]atients with lower socioeconomic status are
more likely than other patients to use the emergency department as their means of
access to the hospital.").
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options. In 1993, there were ninety-six million visits to EDs, or approximately 360 visits for every 1000 Americans. 7 4 As Figures 1 and 2 reflect,
however, there is considerable regional and small-area variation in the util75
ization of EDs.
FIGURE 1: VISITS PER 1000 POPULATION
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Regional utilization ranged from 292 ED visits per 1000 people in the
Mountain region of the United States to 477 ED visits in the East South
Central United States.
74. AMERICAN HOSPITAL AsSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS 6 (1994); see also
STUSSMAN, No. 285, NATIONAL HOSPITAL AMBULATORY MEDICAL CARE
SURVEY. 1995 EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT SUMMARY 1 (1997) (noting that there were
97 million visits to ED in 1995).
75. See Allan S. Detsky, Regional Variationin Medical Care, 333 NEw ENG.J. MED.
589, 590 (1995) (noting that such regional variations are important to patients,
payers and providers). Additionally, the rates of individual ED usage varies widely.
Although the Medicaid population has attracted the most attention, such variation
is observed in other populations as well. See Melissa Brokaw & Adel S. Zaraa, A
Biopsychosocial Profile of the Geriatric Population Who Frequently Visit the Emergency Department, OHIO MED., July 1991, at 347 (noting that geriatric "frequent fliers" repeatedly use ED services inappropriately); P.J. Cunningham et al.,The Use of
Hospital Emergency Departmentsfor Nonurgent Health Problems: A National Perspective,
52 MED. CARE REs. REv. 453, 458 (1995) (noting factors that correlate with increased inappropriate ED usage, including absence of insurance coverage, eligibility for Medicaid, youth and increased number of available EDs).

BARBARA J.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/3

22

Hyman: Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers Cal
1998]

CONSUMER PROTECTION IN A MANAGED CARE WORLD

FIGURE 2: VISITS PER 1000
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At the metropolitan level, annual ED usage in Los Angeles, California and
the Minneapolis-St. Paul region of Minnesota was 270 and 210 visits per
1000 people, respectively, although Chicago and Detroit were much closer
76
to the national average.
In addition, ED utilization is not static. In Tennessee, the movement
of the Medicaid population into managed care had an immediate and
profound impact on ED utilization. 77 As Figure 3 reflects, comparable
decreases in ED utilization have been observed in other parts of the
country.

76. SOCIETY FOR AMBULATORY CARE PROF'L OF THE AM. Hosp. Ass'N,
TRENDLINES, Jan. 1996, at 5 fig.3 (charting ED usage per 1000 population in 1993
for seven cities).
77. See David Brown, Deluged By Medicaid, States Open Wider Umbrellas, WASH.
PosT, June 9, 1996, at A6 (noting profound drop in rate of ED utilization in Tennessee in one year; rate at which Medicaid patients under age 21 visited hospital
EDs cut from 900 visits per 1000 Medicaid patients in 1993 to approximately 500
visits per 1000 TennCare patients in 1994; visits by TennCare patients between ages
21 and 64 dropped by more than one-third). But see Keith Wrenn & Corey M.
Slovis, TennCare in the Emergency Department: The First 18 Months, 27 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 231, 233 (1996) (noting immediate drop of total ED visits of 25%
(40% in pediatric ED visits), but return to normal volume within nine months of
institution of TennCare).
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Although there is considerable regional and small area variation in
ED utilization, one thing does not vary-the fact that many of these ED
visits are not for true emergencies. Both prospective and retrospective
studies have consistently demonstrated that a majority of visits to the ED
are for nonurgent problems. 78 The most extensive prospective study of
78. See e.g.,

GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

GAO/HRD-93-4,

EMERGENCY DE-

PARTMENTS UNEVENLY AFFECTED BY GROWTH AND CHANGE IN PATIENT USE 21

(1993)

(noting that 43% of visits were nonurgent, 40% were urgent and 17% were emergent in nationwide random sample of 1025 hospitals); LINDA F. MCCAIG, No. 245,
NATIONAL HOSPITAL AMBULATORY MEDICAL CARE SURVEY.

1992

EMERGENCY DEPART-

MENT SUMMARY 1 (1994) (stating that in study of ED visits, 55.4% of visits were
nonurgent); Marc Afilalo et al., Emergency Department Use and Misuse, 13 J. EMERGENCY MED. 259, 262 (1995) (collecting various studies showing wide but substantial range of nonurgent care in ED); Steven F. Foldes et al., What is an Emergency?
The Judgments of Two Physicians, 23 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 833, 835 (1994)
(presenting table that reflects results of seven earlier studies, which showed emergency rates from 6% to 35%); Robert Steinbrook, The Role of the Emergency Department, 334 NEW ENG.J. MED. 657, 657 (1996) ("The majority (55.4 percent) [of visits
to emergency departments in this country in 1992] were classified as nonurgent.");
William C. Stratmann & Ralph Ullman, A Study of Consumer Attitudes About Health
Care: The Role of the Emergency Room, 13 MED. CARE 1033, 1034 (1975) (noting estimates of nonurgent visits range from one-third to two-thirds of total visits); Robert
M. Williams, The Costs of Visits to Emergency Departments, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 642,
643 (1996) (noting that 32% of visits were nonurgent, 26% were semiurgent and
42% were urgent at six community hospital EDs in Michigan); Gary P. Young et al.,
Ambulatory Visits to Hospital Emergency Departments: Patterns and Reasons for Use, 276
JAMA 460, 464 (1996) (noting 43%a of ambulatory ED patients were classified as
nonurgent on prospective triage). But see Don P. Buesching et al., Inappropriate

Emergency Department Visits, 14

ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.

672, 672 (1985) (noting

that use of ACEP prudent layperson standard resulted in inappropriate visit rate of
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the issue appeared in the Journal of the American MedicalAssociation in 1996
and presented data from visits to fifty-six hospitals throughout the United
States during a single twenty-four-hour period. 79 An intake nurse at each
ED made a prospective determination as to whether the symptoms justified a visit to the ED.8 0 The study concluded that 49% of the ED visits
were inappropriate, and further evaluation demonstrated that the nurse's
81
prospective determinations were quite accurate, albeit not perfect.
Although many of these visits are unnecessary, they are not cheap.
Estimates of the aggregate excess cost for inappropriate ED usage range
from five to fourteen billion dollars.8 2 High levels of inappropriate ED
only 10.8%, although there was considerable variation among subgroups); Cunningham et al., supranote 75, at 459 (stating that 6.3% of population visited ED for
nonurgent health problems).
79. See Young et al., supra note 78, at 460 (discussing study results).
80. See id. at 461 (noting "triage nurse elicited the patient's chief complaint,
conducted a brief history, obtained vital signs, and performed a brief, directed
examination to determine the urgency of the patient's condition").
81. See id. at 463 (noting that in 5.5% of cases which were identified as
nonurgent, patient ultimately required hospitalization, but prospective assessment
accurately sorted approximately 97.5% of the patients). Interestingly, patients who
were identified as nonurgent and subsequently admitted were more likely to be
insured, and 13% had sought care within the previous two days. See id. at 462
(discussing demographics of study group).
82. See HEALTH CARE ADVISORY BOARD, REDEFINING THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT: FIvE STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING UNNECESSARY VISITS 3 (1993) (noting excess
cost of $14.1 billion because of inappropriate use of ED); Laurence C. Baker &
Linda Schuurman Baker, Excess Cost of Emergency Department Visits for Non-Urgent
Care, 15 HEALTH Arr. 162, 164 (1994) (noting excess cost of $5.4 billion because of
inappropriate use of ED).
The disparity arises from substantially higher average charges in an ED, which
a number of studies have found were in the range of three to five times higher
than for a comparable outpatient visit. Id. (finding two- to three-fold difference);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 78, at 21 ("[Alverage charges for treatment of a nonurgent condition in an ED were from one to five times the average
charge for a Medicaid visit to a clinic or physician's office in the community."
(footnote omitted)).
Emergency medicine physicians believe the true figure is far lower, especially
if one uses marginal cost instead of charges. Williams, supra note 78, at 642 (arguing that marginal cost of providing services in ED is not that much higher than in
ordinary outpatient clinic; "[t]he true costs of nonurgent care in the emergency
department are relatively low" and potential savings from diversion of nonurgent
visits may "be much less than is widely believed"). Although questions have arisen
regarding whether these results can be applied to EDs generally, one commentator
agreed that "the data suggest that much of the purported savings achieved by keeping patients out of the emergency room may never materialize." Steinbrook, supra
note 78, at 657-58.
From an economic perspective, it makes sense to use marginal cost instead of
charges to score the true cost of inappropriate ED usage-but only if hospitals are
actually prepared to charge marginal cost, and there is no excess capacity in the
system. Although considerable evidence indicates that neither of these preconditions are satisfied, these points are not widely appreciated. See, e.g., id. (discussing
assumptions other studies incorporated and concluding these assumptions limit
ability to generalize from findings); see also Arthur L. Kellermann, Nonurgent Emergency Department Visits: Meeting an Unmet Need, 271 JAMA 1953, 1954 (1994) ("Even
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utilization also result in ED overcrowding, which increases costs still further.83 Even modest deductibles and copayments eliminate a substantial
percentage of this inappropriate usage. 84 Presentation at the ED can also
trigger a "clinical cascade," in which the "better safe than sorry" and "cost
is no object" default rules can result in substantial expenses, when more
cost-effective options are available. 85 Finally, continuity, quality and costeffectiveness of care can also be compromised when the care is provided
by an ED-particularly when EDs "treat everyone, no matter how trivial
86
the problem."
One should not overstate the issues or the potential savings. Total ED
if efforts to reduce nonurgent ED visits succeed, it is unlikely that the cost of operating EDs will substantially decline. Most of these costs are fixed because the facilities and staff needed to properly treat emergency patients must be maintained 24
hours a day.").
83. See Paul Krochmal & Tamrah A. Riley, Increased Health Care Costs Associated
with EJ Overcrowding, 12 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 265, 265 (1994) (noting that ED
overcrowding increases inpatient lengths of stay thereby increasing costs per patient); see also Kevin Grumbach et al., Primary Care and PublicEmergency Department
Overcrowding,83 Am.J. PUB. HEALTH 372, 372 (1993) ("[O]vercrowding of hospital
emergency departments in the inner city has reached desperate proportions.").
84. SeeJoe V. Selby et al., Effect of a Copayment on Use of the Emergency Department
in a Health Maintenance Organization,334 NEW ENG.J. MED. 635, 635 (1996) (noting
that copayment of $25 to $35 resulted in 14.6% decline in ED visits, with decline
disproportionately weighted toward less serious conditions); see also Kevin F.
O'Grady et al., The Impact of Cost Sharingon Emergency Department Use, 313 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 484, 484 (1985) (noting that patients without cost sharing had significantly
higher ED expenses, and disproportionate amount of increased use involved less
serious conditions).
In one large study, copayments did not induce delay in seeking necessary care.
See David J. Magid et al., Absence of Association Between Insurance Copayments and Delays in Seeking Emergency Care Among Patientswith MyocardialInfarction, 336 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1722, 1722 (1997) (finding that, even with copayment, patients were not
deterred from seeking treatment). But see Selby, supra, at 640 (warning that results
of study "should not be generalized to apply to low-income groups or the elderly,
particularly as regards the possibility that imposing a copayment could lead to adverse effects"); Steinbrook, supra note 78, at 657 (noting that although study results of Selby and others showed no adverse effects, significant decline in patients
with diagnoses classified as "often an emergency" was troubling because "[b]y any
standard, a substantial proportion of patients with these diagnoses should be evaluated in the emergency department").
85. See Martin S. Karpiel, Capitated Contracting for Emergency Services, 50
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 33, 33 (1996) ("[MCOs] believe emergency services are
overutilized and too expensive, and that emergency department physicians are risk
averse, order too many ancillary services, and over-admit.").
86. Johnson & Derlet, supra note 64, at 140; see also Robert H. Brook et al.,

Effectiveness of Nonemergency Care Via an Emergency Room, 78

ANNALS INTERNAL MED.

333, 333 (1973) (concluding quality of care for treatment of gastrointestinal symptoms found acceptable in only 25% of cases evaluated); Kenneth C. Elam et al.,
How Emergency Physicians Approach Low Back Pain: Choosing Costly Options, 13 J.
EMERGENCY MED. 143, 148 (1994) (noting common approaches of physicians in ED
to lower back pain-imaging, testing and specialist consultation-were costly, unlikely to be of benefit and may well cause harm to patients). But see Gary P. Young

& David Sklar, Health Care Reform and Emergency Medicine, 25
MED.

ANNALS EMERGENCY

666, 666 (1995) (arguing that EDs provide quality care for patients).
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charges accounted for only two to five percent of the health expenditures
87
of the nation, and unnecessary ED visits account for some lesser fraction.
Prospectively sorting out which ED care is inappropriate is frequently difficult. There is considerable interobserver variation in the assessment of
whether a patient should have sought'care at the ED, even among physicians. 8 8 There is also the normative question of whether one should identify ED visits as inappropriate if patients have no other locus from which to
receive care. 8 9 However, such visits need to be paid for by someone, and
from the perspective of an MCO, a substantial amount of money is on the
table if inappropriate ED utilization by its members can be constrained.
Not surprisingly, MCOs sought to limit ED utilization by using such mechanisms as mandatory preauthorization, restrictive coverage, selective con87. See Hoffman, supra note 70, at 348 (observing that unnecessary ED visits
are small percentage of total health expenditures).
88. See Judith C. Brillman et al., Triage: Limitations in PredictingNeed for Emergent Care and Hospital Admission, 27 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 493, 493 (1996) (noting "great variability among physicians, nurses, and a computer program with
regard to triage decisions" and "none of the three performed well in predicting
which patients required admission"); Foldes et al., supra note 78, at 836 (discussing
disagreement as to what constitutes emergency); James M. Gill et al., Disagreement
Among Health Care ProfessionalsAbout the Urgent Care Needs of Emergency Department
Patients, 28 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 474, 475 (1996) ("[E]ven when health care
professionals use the same criteria to measure urgency for the same patients, disagreement may arise as to what constitutes an urgent problem."); James M. Gill,
Nonurgent Use of the Emergency Department: Appropriateor Not?, 24 ANNALS EMERGENCY

953, 953-55 (1994) (discussing variations in determining urgency); Robert A.
Lowe & Andrew B. Bindman, Judging Who Needs Emergency Department Care: A PrerequisiteforPolicy-Making,15 AM.J. EMERGENCY MED. 133, 133 (1997) ("[S]ome literature suggests that patients, clinicians, payers, and policymakers cannot agree as to
what constitutes a true emergency."); Thomas A. Mitchell, Nonurgent Emergency Department Visits-Whose Definition?, 24 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 961, 962 (1994)
(noting disagreements in determining urgency of patients' needs).
Before one dismisses the entire enterprise, it should be understood that there
is considerable disparity of opinion even among ED physicians as to the correct
role of the ED. See Afilalo et al., supra note 78, at 263 ("As demonstrated in a
recent article and pair of editorials, there is little agreement even about the fundamental mission of emergency medicine."). No one reasons, however, from the fact
that there are dissents to many Supreme Court opinions to the claim that one can
safely ignore the conclusion reached by the majority.
89. See Kellerman, supra note 82, at 1953-54. As Dr. Kellerman noted,
[i]s it fair to label nonurgent visits to the ED 'inappropriate' when many
patients have nowhere else to go? Will measures to block or discourage
access to walk-in care in the ED prove harmful to patients who cannot
readily gain access to care in alternative locations?... Instead of considering EDs part of the health care system problem, it could be helpful to
consider them part of the solution. For example, EDs are often the primary point of contact for many poor or disadvantaged citizens. ...
Although treatment in the ED is expensive because most hospitals increase charges to cover the cost of uncompensated care, per-patient
charges for care in the ED could be substantially reduced once universal
health insurance becomes a reality.
Id. at 1953-54. For a discussion of why using EDs for nonurgent care is problematic on economic and quality grounds, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
MED.
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tracting, high copayments and deductibles and aggressive coverage
denials.9 0 The results were pronounced; as managed care targeted ED
utilization, patient visits to the ED declined in 1994 and again in 1995 for
the first time in at least twenty-two years, despite steady increases in the
population and the number of the uninsured. 9 1

B.

EMTALA

EMTAILA requires hospitals to provide screening and stabilization
treatment to all comers, regardless of ability to pay. 92 EMTALA's legislative history reflects its focus on the plight of the uninsured, but the clear
language of the statute also encompassed the insured, and courts have
interpreted it accordingly. 93 Attempts to secure authorization from an
MCO violate EMTALA if they result in any delay in the delivery of services. 9 4 Thus, a hospital is required to provide all necessary screening and
stabilizing treatment, even if it knows the MCO will refuse to pay for the
care because pre-authorization was not (or could not) be properly
95

secured.

90. See Hyman, supra note 63, at 62 (noting MCOs admitted they tried to discourage inappropriate ED usage through a variety of means); see also Harry Davidson Kerr, Access to Emergency Departments: A Survey of HMO Policies, 18 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 274, 276 (1989) (discussing gate-keeping mechanisms employed
by HMOs to contain costs generated in EDs); Hoffman, supra note 70, at 331-32
(discussing managed care providers' denial of ED claims). Unless the condition is
life-threatening, patients must obtain prior authorization before seeking emergency care services in 80% of the responding HMOs, and 39% of HMOs limited
their members to using the EDs of selected network hospitals. See Kerr, supra, at
274. Many indemnity insurers have adopted similar provisions. See PHYSIcIAN PAYMENT REvIEw COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 136 (discussing limits on ED usage).
91. See Ron Winslow, Emergency Room Visits Fall as HMOs Target Overuse, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 7, 1996, at B2 (discussing decline in ED usage).
92. EMTALA imposes a duty on hospitals to evaluate all arriving patients, as
well as the duty to stabilize patients with emergency medical conditions. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (requiring EDs to provide treatment to "any individual" seeking care with emergency medical condition and noting that duty to treat terminates only when patient is stabilized, appropriately transferred or dead).
Noncompliance by hospitals can result in stiff civil penalties, including monetary

fines. See id. § 1395dd(d) (imposing "a civil money penalty of not more than
$50,000 . . . for each such violation"). In addition, EMTALA covers specialty care
and "reverse" dumping (the refusal to accept transfers of patients requiring specialty care).

93. See id. § 1395dd(a) (stating that "any individual" who presents to hospital
is entitled to medical screening regardless of insurance coverage); Gatewood v.
Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that
"any individual" means any individual); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group,
Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990) (same).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h) ("A participating hospital may not delay provision of an appropriate medical screening examination required under subsection
(a) of this section or further medical examination and treatment required under
subsection (b) of this section in order to inquire about the individual's method of
payment or insurance status.").
95. See generally David A. Hyman, PatientDumping and EMTALA: PastImperfect/
Future Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 29 (1997).
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C.

Cost-Quality Trade-offs

Insurance is a mechanism for contractual shifting, spreading and allocation of risk. Regulation of the contractual terms is left to the states,
unless ERISA preemption applies-in which case there is effectively no
substantive regulation. 96 Those risks that are not transferred are self-insured. Coverage which is more generous is also more expensive. Copayments and deductibles help fine-tune the coverage (and deal with the
problem of moral hazard) by allowing for a mix of self-insurance and
third-party coverage. Not surprisingly, a policy with a substantial copayment and deductible is substantially cheaper than one with first-dollar
coverage.
Willingness to purchase insurance is heterogeneous, and greatly affected by the premium. 9 7 As the premium increases, the policy becomes
less affordable for people at the margin. Policy sellers must weigh whether
broadening coverage, ensuring more accurate prospective coverage decisions and enhancing internal grievance procedures are worth doing if they
price the policy out of the market-or result in a shift in the nature of
coverage from that which is most appealing to the covered pool as a
whole. Those who would willingly have bought a less elaborate policy
must self-insure (become one of the forty million uninsured Americans)
once the cost of the minimum product exceeds their willingness or ability
to pay.98 Thus, better protection for some groups or conditions is neces96. The implications of the regulatory mismatch created by ERISA, as well as
the consequences of the dominance of employer-based health insurance are beyond the scope of this Article. For a brief discussion of this issue, see supra note 43,
infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. For a more thorough discussion of this
issue, see generally Hyman, supra note 21.
97. See Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of Health Insurance
to Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 AM.J.L. & MED. 187, 188 (1994)

(noting wide differences in coverage preferences, and suggesting health insurance
plans should offer range of choices so consumers can pick Cadillac care, Buick
care or Chevrolet care); Martin Gottlieb, Picking a Health Plan: A Shot in the Dark,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at 3:1 ("[C]hoosing a health plan is a personal matter,
and personal needs vary. While quality.., might seem the primary consideration,
it isn't always. Young people, who are less concerned about getting sick, usually
cast a much harder eye on price. So do poorer people."); see generally CLARK HAVICHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH
REFORM (1995) (presenting evidence of variable consumer preferences for differ-

ent levels of health insurance coverage and arguing private contracts can effectively implement such variable preferences).
98. Approximately 15.5% of the U.S. population is currently uninsured. 1997
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl. 172. There, is considerable stateto-state variation in the percentage of the population that is uninsured. See id. In
Wisconsin, only 7.3 percent of the population is uninsured, while in New Mexico,
25.6% of the population is uninsured. See id. In general, southern and southwestern states have the highest percentage of their population uninsured. See id.
The cost of coverage obviously has an impact on the number of the uninsured. In assessing the impact of the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection
Act, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a uniform increase of 1% in
the cost of insurance coverage would result in 200,000 currently insured individu-
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sarily purchased at the expense of the rest of the covered pool, and some
of them will decline coverage entirely.
D.

Conflict

Caught between EMTALA and managed care, hospitals are left in a
bad way in dealing with both uninsured and insured patients. Under the
old (premanaged care) system, revenues from the insured offset charity
care provided to the uninsured. 99 The new (managed care) system has
fewer insured patients presenting to the ED, and less reimbursement when
an insured patient does present to the ED, to the extent there is any reimbursement at all. 10 0 EMTALA may obligate hospitals to screen and treat
all persons, but MCOs are under no compulsion to pay for such efforts,
particularly if contractually required pre-authorization was not obtained.
Furthermore, securing such pre-authorization runs a substantial risk of violating EMTALA, even if the MCO maintains an adequate system for providing pre-authorization, which not all MCOs do.' 0 1 In addition, insured
patients could sign up for an exceedingly restrictive MCO, but unilaterally
present to any ED if they wished to receive care. Thus, EMTALA effecals becoming uninsured. As it is, approximately eight million Americans could
purchase employer-arranged health insurance, but chose not to do so. See Philip F.
Cooper & Barbara Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takers for Employment-Based
Health Insurance: 1987 and 1996, 16 HEALTH AFF. 142, 142 (1997).
Even when individuals purchase health insurance, they have a distinct tendency to purchase the lower-priced spread. The Medicare supplemental insurance
market ("Medigap") illustrates the phenomenon nicely. Federal law specifies that
insurers can only offer ten standard Medigap policies, lettered A through J,with
plan A offering the cheapest and most basic coverage. See David J. Morrow, High
Cost of Plugging the Gaps in Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, at 3:8 (comparing
provisions of 10 available Medigap plans). Plans H, I, andJ offer prescription drug
benefits. See id. Although Medicare beneficiaries are frequent users of prescription pharmaceuticals, and their advocates invariably suggest Medicare should be
expanded to include such coverage, few Medigap patients voluntarily sign up for
Plans H through J. See id.
99. See Hyman, Conundrum of Charitability,supra note 30, at 371-72. In an earlier article, the author noted that
[i]f the nonprofit hospital views its role as providing health care to those
in need, everyone pays the cross-subsidy for charges which they did not
incur. Because our society is not willing to pay for universal health insurance, the nonprofit hospital attempts to recover unreimbursed costs from
two smaller groups: the citizens that live within the local taxing district
and the insurance companies of patients.
Id. Although cost-shifting comes in for a bad name, profit-maximizing firms with
good information also charge differential rates based on relative demand. The
author has met few casual travellers who bemoan the fact that a "stay-over-Saturday" plane ticket costs a fraction of the "in-and-out-on-a-weekday-business-special."
100. See generally Hyman, supra note 95. The financial consequences were predictable. SeeJennifer Preston, As Revenues Drop, Hospitals Talk of ForsakingCharity
Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1996, at Al (noting increasing reluctance of hospitals to
provide charity care, as losses have accumulated).
101. For a discussion of the varying mechanisms used by MCOs for
preauthorization, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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tively leaves hospitals at the mercy of free-riding MCOs-and both at the
10 2
mercy of free-riding patients.
Hospitals faced the unappetizing prospect of losses on both their insured and uninsured patients, but could not refuse to deal (the usual remedy for expected nonpayment or inadequate payment) because of
EMTALA. Virtuous MCOs wanted to keep their members out of EDs unless there was truly an emergency. Less-virtuous MCOs could use the ED
as a safety valve for after-hours coverage and could always deny coverage if
a true emergency was not diagnosed. Patients who went to the ED wanted
their MCO to provide coverage, but premiums would only stay low if
MCOs could control the use of high-cost providers (like EDs) by their
members.
Patients seemingly had to decide before they went to the ED if they
actually had an emergency medical condition-and the wrong decision
had negative consequences in both directions. A false-negative decision
exposed the patient to a risk of death or disability. A false-positive decision exposed the patient to staggering medical bills. Of course, this problem was not unique to managed care; any insurance plan forces the
patient to decide whether to go to the hospital or not-and deciding in10 3
correctly carries some of the same potential for adverse consequences.
102. See Sham, supra note 64, at Al (discussing denial of ED claims).
Whether MCOs and patients believe they are free-riding is a different question.
MCO representatives who comment on the issue insist that they are doing their
part to deliver cost-effective health care, and the ED physicians are generalizing
from a few unrepresentative anecdotes. See Sham, supra note 64, at Al (noting
MCO argument that "[t]here isn't a plot against emergency medicine").
As for patients, few people view the ED as an ideal place to spend a Saturday
evening. Certainly, most patients who go to the ED believe they need to be seen
there. See David W. Baker et al., Determinants of Emergency Department Use by Ambulatory Patientsat an Urban PublicHospital, 25 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 311, 313 (1995)
(finding 89% of patients believed they needed immediate medical attention, even
when they said their condition was not serious, painful or debilitating; only 44%
required care within 24 hours according to evaluating physician); Foldes et al.,
supra note 78, at 837-40 (noting that there is no consensus among providers (internists and ED physicians), let alone among patients and providers about necessity
for seeking care at ED); Robert M. Williams, Triage and Emergency Department Services, 27 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 506, 507 (1996) (noting that "perception of sever-

ity of symptoms varies among individuals and groups, and patients seek care for a
multitude of personal, cultural, financial, and social reasons").
Whether they believe they need to be seen in an ED because it is more convenient than the alternatives, or because they believe they cannot wait is another
matter. See Cunningham et al., supra note 75, at 470 ("The main reason most persons use the hospital ED for nonurgent problems has less to do with an absolute
lack of access to more appropriate sources of primary care than perhaps with issues
of convenience and preference ....");Stratmann & Ullman, supra note 78, at
1042-43 (noting that many people use ED because they believe their problem to be
urgent and alternative sources of care are less convenient). Thus, it is not surprising that the decision to actually seek such care depends greatly on the financial
implications of that decision. For a discussion of the effect of copayments on ED
usage, see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
103. See Helen Lippman, The Games Plans Play with ER Bills, BusINESS &
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Complaints surfaced about retrospective denial of coverage by MCOs,
widely differing definitions among MCOs of what constituted an emergency, difficulties with obtaining pre-authorization, coverage only if an actual emergency was diagnosed after the work-up had been performed, and
long-distance second-guessing of ED doctors by utilization review
nurses. 10 4 MCOs denied that a problem existed, although they admitted
that they tried to discourage inappropriate ED usage.' 0 5 Empirical data
on the severity of the problem was sketchy at best, but the American College of Emergency Physicians ("ACEP") used a number of horrific anecdotes to argue that access to the ED had to be safeguarded with consumer
10 6
protection laws.
In response to these concerns, legislatures quickly enacted laws regulating access to the ED for MCO members. Although these laws and bills
differ in their details, they are based on a few simple models.
1.

PrudentPatient or Reasonable Person Standard

MCOs frequently use different definitions of the circumstances under
which they will cover a visit to the ED.' 0 7 The prudent patient or reasonHEALTH,

June 1996, at 20 (recounting anecdote of fee-for-service insurance plan

that denied coverage for ED visit to evaluate chest pain). Of course, any system
that depends on pre-authorization also exposes insured individuals to the risk of a
true positive for which appropriate authorization was not sought-leading to the
same financial risk as for false positives.
104. For discussion of complaints about managed care and emergency care,
see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
105. For a discussion of discouraging ED usage, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
106. See Gregory Henry, Emergency Care Under Managed Care: A Fatal Distraction, HEALTH Sys. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 55 (providing ACEP's anecdotes). Such
anecdotes were also circulated through a variety of other venues. ANDERS, supra
note 6, at 132-49 (collecting anecdotes); Hoffman, supra note 70, at 333-34 (col-

lecting anecdotes).
Although these narratives had a major impact, there was no indication of the
typicality and prevalence of these problems. Even compelling anecdotes provide

an unsound basis for public policy, absent proof of typicality, truthfulness and frequency. See David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73

IND.

L. J. 797

(1998) (arguing case for EMTAIA was based on untruthful and atypical anecdotes). The problem of unrepresentative anecdotes is not unique to this issue. In
commenting on proposals to make lawyers do more to prevent their clients from
committing fraud, Professor Langevoort observed that
[i]n all fairness, of course, we do not know whether a serious problem
really exists. The scandals, publicized more through indictments and allegations than legal findings of complicity, are highly salient, vivid bits of
information that naturally skew our impressions. We lack actual base-rate
data establishing the incidence of complicity, or documentation of the
offsetting events when attorney involvement has somehow deterred client
misconduct.
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients'Fraud,46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 77 (1993).
107. See ANDERS, supra note 6, at 136-37 (discussing use of different standards
for authorizing ED visits); Hoffman, supra note 70, at 335 (same); Pear, supra note
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able person model contractual term eliminates such variation, and requires the MCO to pay for care provided in the ED if a prudent layperson
with an average knowledge of medicine and health and experiencing the
same symptoms would have gone to the ED-or if a reasonable person
would have done so. Three MCOs are on record as supporting this standard, and at least two MCOs already use it to judge whether to cover emergency care.10 8 The American Association of Health Plans has endorsed
the reasonable person standard as well.
This model contractual term has considerable intuitive appeal. After
all, why should MCOs pay for unreasonable or imprudent behavior, and
why shouldn't they pay if the behavior was prudent and reasonable? Unfortunately, words like "prudence" and "reasonableness" require the MCO
to apply an inherently factual (albeit not wholly subjective) standard,
which can always be second-guessed when coverage is denied-but is
never second-guessed when coverage is extended. Although this solution
appears to finesse the coverage issue, its indeterminacy actually has the
potential to cause severe secondary disputes, even if MCOs proceed with
the utmost good faith. 10 9 As a general proposition, there are also benefits
to diversity of terms, even for coverage of emergency care.1 10
1, at Al ("Most HMOs promise to cover emergency medical services, but there is
no standard definition of the term. HMOs can define it narrowly and typically
reserve the right to deny payment if they conclude, in retrospect, that the conditions treated were not emergencies.").
108. See Andrea Gerlin, New Law Doesn't Settle Debate, PHIL. INQUIRER, Aug. 17,
1997, at DI (noting that Kaiser Permanente and Aetna U.S. Healthcare favor prudent layperson standard and Aetna U.S. Healthcare uses standard in its commercial HMOs); Doug Levy, Taking Guesswork out of ER Coverage, USA TODAY, Aug. 19,
1996, at D2 (noting that Kaiser Permranente uses prudent layperson standard in
California, Colorado, and Hawaii and joined with American College of Emergency
Physicians in calling for nationwide use of standard).
109. The dispute as to whether "reasonable" is more restrictive or less restrictive than "prudent layperson," both with and without the qualifier "with an average
knowledge of medicine," suggests the difficulty of implementing standard-let
alone the costs of resolving appeals of adverse decisions. See Hoffman, supranote
70, at 390-93 (debating which standard is stricter); President's Advisory Comm. on
Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Indus., Subcomm. on Consumer Rights Protections and Responsibilities (visited March 1, 1998) <http://
www.hcqualitycommission.gov/jun25.26/testcons.html> (discussing debate regarding which standard is more strict).
Unhappiness with such open-ended reasonableness standards is commonplace. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canardsof ContemporaryLegal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
REs. L. R.Ev. 581, 591 (1990) ("But what guidance does such a principle provide for
the lower courts, and what check is it against the personal preferences of future
judges? 'Be reasonable and do not go too far' is hardly more informative than 'Do
justice,' or 'Do good and avoid evil.'"); Stanley S. Surrey, Treasury'sNeed to Curb Tax
Avoidance in Foreign Business Through Use of 482, 28J. TAX'N 75, 76 (1968) ("While
the test of reasonableness has its uses in some situations, in this area it is not sufficiently precise to provide guidance-reasonable by what or by whose standards?").
110. But see Peter Passell, Economic Scene: When PoliticiansSeek to Please on Medical Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at D2 (arguing that diversity of coverage for
some kinds of benefits, such as trauma care, are unlikely to be valued, since
"[h]ardly anyone, presumably, would choose to opt out of the right to trauma care
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If patients actually want increased ex ante certainty about which visits
to the ED will be covered, the prudent layperson or reasonable person
standard will probably not make things better-particularly when the enforcement of the "new and improved" standard is left in the hands of the
MCOs in the first instance.1 11 In addition, if the current high level of
inappropriate ED utilization is any guide, the prudent layperson or reasonable person standard is an extremely overinclusive coverage term.
Either all of these people are being imprudent or unreasonable, or the
MCOs will have to pay for "inappropriate" but reasonable ED visits, which
account for somewhere between ten and ninety percent of total ED visits. 112 Coverage that includes this term will also be more expensive than
more restrictive alternatives-especially if coupled with limitations on the
113
use of copayments and deductibles.
in the emergency room in order to save on insurance premiums").
111. See Gerlin, supra note 108, at D1. As this article reflects,
[e]ven some groups that participated in formulating the "prudent layperson" standard, as it is known, question whether it's so subjective that
health plans will continue to challenge the prudence of patients' actions
during emergencies and deny claims for ER charges. What is prudent to
one person, they note, may not be prudent to another-or to a health
plan. "This is in a legal sense considered to be an objective standard, but
it's not going to eliminate legal disputes over emergency visits... You're
going to find Monday morning quarterbacking going on by certain
health plans."
Id.

112. For a discussion of the frequency of inappropriate ED visits, see supra
note 78 and accompanying text.
113. Some of the consumer protection bills at the federal level preclude insurers from setting copayments and deductibles for the use of the ED any higher
than would be the case for such services provided in other settings, unless the
Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that the copayment is reasonable and will deter inappropriate use of ED services. See, e.g., The Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, S. 373, H.R. 820, 105th Cong. How much more
expensive such standards will turn out to be is an open question. See Hoffman,
supra note 70, at 395-96 (noting limited data on effect of mandated emergency
care coverage on insurance premiums).
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence available on the impact of a
prudent layperson standard-and the impact obviously depends a great deal on
where the baseline is pegged, and the population to which it is applied. Medicare
managed care has mandatory appeals of all MCO claim denials to an outside contractor. See id. at 362-68 (analyzing Medicare approach). In 1992, the Health Care
Financing Administration modified the guidelines for determining coverage from
a more restrictive objective standard to one which emphasizes prospective subjective reasonableness. See id. at 365 (stating that guidelines provided that emergencies are determined when service is rendered and clear cases of "routine
illness[es]" are not covered). Although the number of appeals was minuscule, the
extraordinarily high rate at which the contractor upheld claim denials (78% denials in 1992) was not significantly affected by this change in the standard (72% in
1995). See id. at 367. The rate of appeals also dropped modestly, but the number
of appeals is so tiny to begin with that it is impossible to determine whether the
change in the standard actually eliminated the necessity for appeal. On the other
hand, some research suggests that most ED visits are justified under a prudent
layperson standard. See Buesching et al., supra note 78, at 672.
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Finally, if reasonableness is such an excellent (and virtually cost-neutral) standard, then why did Congress abandon its use of reasonable cost
reimbursement under Medicare in 1982 by adopting the prospective payment system? 1 14 Similar questions are raised by the efforts of the nation's
governors, who lobbied Congress for years to eliminate a similar term forcing state Medicaid programs to reimburse the reasonable costs of providers.115 Those who live by the sword should be prepared to have it turned
against them-and the reluctance of the states and Congress to accept a
reasonableness standard when they are footing the bill counsels caution
when they propose imposing a similar standard on private parties.
2.

Restrictions on PriorAuthorization

Depending on the circumstances, many MCOs require prior authorization before they will agree to cover care provided at an ED. 1 16 Most of
the consumer protection statutes prohibit the use of this contractual term,
although there is some variation in whether the statute encompasses
screening examinations and stabilizing or emergency treatment, or all
care provided in an ED. Some statutes specify maximum periods within
which the MCO must provide a response or the care is deemed authorized. Other statutes prohibit advance authorization unless the MCO maintains twenty-four-hour medical coverage.
As with the reasonable or prudent person standard, this consumer
protection has considerable intuitive appeal. There seems little purpose
in requiring advance authorization in an emergency. Yet, as noted previously, many people go to the ED for nonemergencies. Requiring advance
authorization discourages such conduct and allows the MCO to divert
some such patients from the ED, or at least forces members to self-insure
for the resulting expense if they do not obtain such approval. MCO administrators refer to these efforts as demand management, and many pa114. See Bruce C. Vladeck, Medicare HospitalPayment by Diagnosis-RelatedGroups,
MED. 576, 576 (1984).
115. See Associated Press, Homes Assail Repeal of Their Shield Against Cuts, ST.
Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 1997, at 24 (reporting repeal of Boren Amendment, which required Medicaid payments to hospitals and nursing homes to be
"reasonable and adequate" to meet costs of efficiently and economically operated
facilities); Benjamin Marrison, Voinovich Leads U.S. Governors: Says Bipartisan Effort
Needed to Make States' Agenda Reality, PLAIN DEALER, July 31, 1997, at 10A (noting
long-standing bipartisan desire of governors to repeal Boren Amendment). Since
a 1990 Supreme Court decision dealing with this issue, "scores of hospitals and
nursing homes have forced states to increase their payments by suing them for
violations of this standard." Robert Pear, Congress Preparing a Major Overhaul of
Medicaid, N.Y. TiMEs, June 12, 1995, at B7; see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n,
496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990) (holding Boren Amendment enforceable in § 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by health care providers).
116. See ANDERS, supra note 6, at 133-34; Hoffman, supra note 70, at 331-32
(describing prior authorization requirement as "obstacle to care"); Young, supra
note 70, at 557-59.
100
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tients get better care at lower cost as a result.'
Prohibitions on advance authorization unless twenty-four-hour coverage is maintained also have the effect of conferring a significant advantage
on larger and more established MCOs. Perhaps people only want to
purchase coverage from such MCOs, but there is no a priori reason to
think so. Each MCO offers its own mix of providers, restrictions on access,
coverage and cost. Against this diversity of arrangements, consumer protection laws should not be used to dictate the terms on which ED care is
provided. If anything, the objective of this "consumer protection" seems
to be the restriction of competition from smaller and less well-established

MCOs.

3.

1 18

Reasonable Access to Any ED
The two consumer protections outlined so far do not explicitly ad-

dress whether a patient can go to any ED. Absent financial constraints,
many people would obviously prefer a free-access rule, but such a rule
prevents MCOs from using their financial leverage to extract lower rates

from EDs through selective contracting. Accordingly, MCOs typically provide limited coverage if care is sought from an out-of-network provider,
absent a true emergency. 1 19 The consumer protection initiative eliminates this disparity, at least as long as it was prudent to go to the ED in the
first place.
As with the other provisions, this model contractual term sounds perfectly sensible, and it is clearly a reasonable corollary to the first two consumer protection initiatives. The term, however, suffers from many of the
same infirmities. The closest ED is not necessarily the best one, and MCOs
are likely to be in a better position to assess such matters. In addition,
117. See Peter T. Kilborn, For Managed Care, Dial the Keepers of the Cures, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at A14 (describing specific instances of how pre-authorization
works and how it saves MCOs money). But see ANDERS, supra note 6, at 132-49
(acknowledging phone screening can result in benefits for patients, but adding
extensive list of anecdotes suggesting bad outcomes can easily happen).
118. See Pear, supra note 36, at Al. As this article reflects,
[tlhree big health maintenance organizations joined two consumer
groups today in calling for more regulation of managed health care, saying all health plans should be subject to 'legally enforceable national
standards.' ... Kaiser, HIP and the Group Health Cooperative see themselves as
having a deeper commitment to consumer protection than many commercial
H.M.O.'s, but they say it is difficult to fulfill that commitment ifthey can be
undercut by competitors not bound by the same standards.
Id. (emphasis added).

For a more general perspective on such conduct, see Steven C. Salop et al., A
Bidding Analysis of Special Interest Regulation: Raising Rivals' Cost in a Rent Seeking
Society, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 102
119. See ANDERS,

(1986).

supra note 6, at 144-46 (describing instances in which insurance company denied claims because patients were treated at out-of-network facilities); Hoffman, supra note 70, at 329, n.49 (noting prior approval is "most often
required for 'out of network' care").
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free-access is expensive, and cost is clearly a relevant consideration for
many people ex ante, even if they voice different views ex post.
4.

Required Reimbursement for Screening Examinations

EMTALA forces EDs to perform screening examinations on everyone
seeking treatment, but many MCOs are (understandably) not keen about
paying the retail cost for such screening examinations, especially when the
problem was not an emergency. 120 This model contractual term mandates reimbursement of the expenses for the screening examination,
although there is some variation at the state level on whether the initial
visit had to be prudent or reasonable. The President's Commission's recommendations require the initial visit to be prudent or reasonable, as
does the pending Federal legislation.
As with the other model contractual terms, MCO subscribers are
forced to purchase coverage for a risk for which they had contractually
self-insured, and coverage makes it more likely the ultimate cost for
screening examinations (both per patient and total) will be higher. The
principal beneficiaries of this provision are hospitals and ED physicianswhich explains why such legislation has been a top priority for emergency
physician groups at the state and national levels. The consequences will
ultimately be reflected in the premiums MCOs charge their members.
It does seem unfair for hospitals to get stuck with the bills for insured
patients, when it was clearly Congress' intent that they only be stuck with
the bills for uninsured patients.1 21 The implicit assumption, however, that
we must build another layer of statutory oversight on top of EMTALA to
solve the problems EMTALA has induced strikes one as a peculiar strat120. See Williams, supra note 78, at 643-44 (noting that charges are substantially higher for care received in ED, even though marginal cost and average cost
are not significantly more expensive); Lippman, supra note 103, at 20 ("'HMOs are
certainly willing to pay for screening costs' but object to paying high ER costs when
no emergency exists [according to] a spokesman for the American Association of
Health Plans.").
121. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt.1, at 27 (describing Congress concern
"about the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients . .. if [they] do[ ] not have medical insurance").
The time to rethink the policy underlying EMTALA may have finally come. Opposition to unfunded mandates is now near universal and EMTALA certainly qualifies as an unfunded mandate, albeit one imposed on private parties. See Daniel H.
Cole & Carol S. Comer, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Law of Unfunded FederalMandates,8
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 103, 103 (1997) (noting widespread opposition to unfunded
mandates); David A. Dana, The Casefor Unfunded EnvironmentalMandates, 69 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1, 1 (1995) ("[Flederal mandates-unfunded federal legislation inducing
state and local governments to take some action-now have achieved something
akin to the status of Soviet Communism during the heyday of the McCarthy era:
Everybody is against them.").
More importantly, if the touchstone for EMTALA was that everyone should
have access to the ED because the insured do, the restrictions which managed care
has imposed on access to the ED undercut the moral case for EMTALA. See generally Hyman, supra note 95.
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egy. 122 More generally, as the developments outlined in this Article make
clear, EMTALA effectively pegs the level of emergency care coverage
above the amount that people are voluntarily willing to pay-a strategy
12 3
that is inspirational, but has little else to recommend it.
5.

Pay for Everything Performed in an ED

The final statutory model requires MCOs to pay for all services performed in the ED. No state has adopted a statute based on this model, but
Maryland is coming close. House Bill 615, which was passed by the Maryland General Assembly and vetoed by the Governor, required MCOs to
pay for all care received by their members at an ED without regard to
prior authorization or contractual restrictions. 124 In his veto letter, the
Governor objected to House Bill 615 because the State of Maryland would
end up footing some of the bill. The veto letter estimated the on-budget
cost of House Bill 615 at $1.6 million for the remainder of fiscal year 1996
and $3.4 million for fiscal year 1997, but observed that the costs could be
substantially greater. It is hard to escape the suspicion that the on-budget
cost was a major factor in the decision to veto the bill.
More recently, Maryland enacted House Bill 859, which effectively requires an MCO to reimburse EDs for care provided to its members, but
allows the MCO to seek repayment from its members if it concludes the
care was not covered. 125 Obviously, such consumer protection statutes are
the most sweeping of all of the models. Although they ensure compensation of the ED, they do so by largely destroying the ability of an MCO to
constrain the behavior of its members, resulting in higher medical and
insurance costs for all involved.
122. The obvious solution, as suggested in an earlier article, is to repeal EMTALA insofar as it applies to the insured, and allow ED coverage to seek its own
level. See id.
123. See id. But see Hoffman, supra note 70, at 349-51 (arguing that various
market imperfections and externalities prevent Americans from purchasing level
of emergency care coverage they "really" want).
124. See H.B. 615, 1995 Leg., 1st Sess. (Md. 1995) (stating that MCOs were
required to pay for all ED care). As originally proposed, the bill contained certain
provisions relating to emergency services (required reimbursement at specified
rates and restrictions on use of prior authorization) and nonemergency services
(MCO had to pay for care if it directed or referred the member to the ED, but
could collect from the patient otherwise). The provisions relating to nonemergency services were struck prior to enactment by the Maryland House of Representatives, which added additional restrictions on the use of prior authorization in
an emergency. The Maryland Senate passed a bill with slight differences from the
House version. When the bill emerged from the Conference Committee, it had
become transformed into a bill that mandated coverage of all services provided in
an ED, and prohibited entirely the use of pre-authorization as a condition for
payment.
125. See H.B. 859, 1996 Leg., 1st Sess" (Md. 1996) (specifying that MCO must
reimburse for ED screening examinations required by EMTALA and all medically
necessary services if MCO "authorized, directed, referred, or otherwise allowed"
use of ED or if MCO does not provide 24-hour access to services).
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E.

Summary

Even with a well-defined self-contained problem, designing a cost-effective consumer protection is not an easy task. As the stakes and complexity of the issues increase, the difficulty increases exponentially. In the
rush to embrace sensible-sounding solutions, one should not overlook the
infirmities that accompany the proposed reform and the dangers of oversimplifying the problem. In the ED, the reforms outlined in this Article
are based on the notions that everyone would buy the specified coverage if
given a choice; that it is clear to prudent or reasonable laypersons whether
a particular set of symptoms requires evaluation and treatment in an ED;
that economic considerations should not enter into such life-or-death decisions; and that the cost and character of an appropriate diagnostic workup and treatment is not debatable. These claims are inspiring, but reflect
an overly optimistic view of human behavior, an oversimplification of the
issues and a misunderstanding of the universality of scarcity. Even when
economic incentives are taken out of the picture, there is considerable
variation in the perceived need for a visit to the ED. 1 26 The economic
issues complicate matters considerably. In the abstract, everyone wants
comprehensive health insurance, but those who foot the bill quickly realize there is a difference between coverage that is good and coverage that is
good enough. Consumers have voted with their feet for cheaper (more restrictive) health care coverage, and their ex post complaints about the
same do not change that fact. 12 7 These statutes are not really about consumer protection, but rather the maintenance of implicit cross-subsidies,
provider protection and legislative posturing. The relatively trivial example of access to the ED shows that legislative caution is likely to be the
better part of consumer protection.
V.

NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE

For those who prefer narrative scholarship, the following story may be
more persuasive. 128 A friend owned a home, but traveled a great deal on
126. See ANDERS, supra note 6, at 142 ("Many cases are hard enough to diagnose that there is no dramatic showdown between medical professionals on one
side and HMO bureaucrats on the other."). For a discussion of the varying interpretations of "emergency," see supra notes 88, 102 and accompanying text.
127. To be sure, additional complexity is induced by the fact that many employers do not offer a choice of plans, so we do not have a fair market test among
different managed care providers and coverage options. Yet, the bundling that is
necessary to accomplish group coverage means that there will always be some people who were unable to buy the precise coverage they wanted.
Such market imperfections are troubling, but to some extent are inevitableand merely identifying such problems does not mean that all bets are off. No one
would argue that Medigap insurers selling Plans A through G should provide coverage for prescription pharmaceuticals because the omitted services are lifesaving
or important. Yet, that is precisely the argument on which advocates are relying to
advance consumer protections against managed care.
128. Narrative scholarship has been booming, despite criticisms of its typicality and truthfulness. See Hyman, supra note 106, at 797.
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business. 129 He was deeply concerned about the risks of a break-in while
he was away because he had many valuable possessions, and the area was
experiencing a rash of burglaries on weekends. He was also worried about
his personal safety in the event of a robbery or home invasion. A large dog
would lower the risk of robbery or home invasion, but was not really an
option because he traveled so much.
My friend happened to see an advertisement for a home alarm system, and decided to have one installed. The alarm was state-of-the-art. All
of the doors and windows were wired, and there were motion detectors
inside the house. There was also external monitoring; the alarm would go
off if someone came to the front or rear doors after dark. The alarm was
hooked up to a central location, which called the house if the alarm went
off. If no one answered, or if someone answered and gave the wrong password, the police were called. The police came out and if no one was
home, they walked around the outside of the house to make sure there
had not been a break-in.
My friend believed casual burglars would be deterred by the alarm
company stickers he had on the front and rear doors. However, he was
still concerned about sophisticated burglars-especially because he had
just been featured in the local newspaper as a jet-setting lawyer. He decided on his next business trip he would try and have the police check on
his house every weekend. To his dismay, he discovered that the police
were unwilling to provide such services and would only go to check his
house if there was an alarm or a phone call to 911.
The alarm was so advanced, my friend could check on its status (including arming and disarming the system, and setting off the alarm) by
phone. My friend realized that he could set off the alarm on Friday and
Saturday nights by calling in, and the police would come out and check on
things in his absence. On his next month-long trip out of town, he called
the house every weekend night at different times and set off the alarm.
Coincidentally, the alarm went off on its own a half-dozen times, when
people came to the door after dark.
On his return, my friend was faced with unhappy neighbors, irritated
police and a staggering bill from the local township, which had decided
the only way to stem the tide of false alarms was to start charging people
129. The author confesses no such friend exists, although the author has had
a number of false burglar alarms. In narrative circles, however, it appears to be
perfectly acceptable to simply make things up, and pass them off as truthful. See,
e.g., Robert L. Hayman,Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine,Narrative,
and the Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL. L. REv. 377, 400 n.83 (1996) ("But
the truth or falsity of autobiographical details is rarely important to the narrative
message: the stories themselves are generally metaphors, or stories about subjective
impressions."); Alex M.Johnson,Jr., Defending the Use of Narrativeand Giving Content
to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79
IOWA L. REv. 803, 816 n.65 (1994) ("I think it is perfectly acceptable ...[in legal
narratives] if that which is presented as the truth turns out not to be objectively
true in the way in which that standard typically is viewed and used.").
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for them. My friend was unhappy because he did not realize that his decision to try and protect the. things that were most precious to him would
result in such heavy financial consequences. One of his neighbors, however, pointed out to him that his payment of a monitoring fee did not
entitle him to unlimited personal security-particularly when the costs of
his decisions were borne by his neighbors, the taxpaying citizens of the
local township and the police.
My friend is not alone. As fear of crime has increased, home alarm
130
Most
systems have become ubiquitous in many parts of the country.
such systems are hooked into a central monitoring station that either notifies the police or sends private security guards in the event of an alarm.
Although the alarm is intended to be triggered only when there is a threat
to property or life (a burglary or home invasion), false alarms account for
an exceedingly high percentage of alarms.13 1 The police have grown increasingly tired of responding to false alarms because they divert the police from other law enforcement efforts. With the enthusiastic support of
the alarm industry, many communities have imposed substantial fees for
132
each false alarm.
Thus, private efforts to obtain personal security that imposed excess
costs on one's fellow citizens were shifted back to the individual-even in
a nation in which crime is a perennial top priority. Treating every alarm
as a true emergency was simply not a sustainable strategy when the aggregate social costs swamped the marginal individual safety benefit. In short,
the payment of a modest monthly fee did not entitle one to "cry wolf'
more than once or twice. In like fashion, the payment of a monthly health
insurance premium does not entitle a subscriber to more than the contract provides-if the. contract is limited to the provision of necessary
emergency care, the subscriber has no complaint if nonemergency serv130. See National Burglar & Fire Alarm Assoc., Inc., Quick Facts & Stats About
the Electronic Security Industry (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.alarm.org/
quick.htm> [hereinafter Quick Facts & Stats] (discussing home alarm systems); National Burglar & Fire Alarm Assoc., Inc., The Model Cities Program (visited Mar. 1,
1998) <http://www.alarm.org/modcity.htm> [hereinafter The Model Cities Program]
(same). There were approximately 2.6 million burglaries in the United States in
1995, or one every twelve seconds. See Quick Facts & Stats, supra. Approximately
20% of American homes are electronically protected, although not all of these
alarms are connected to a central monitoring system. See id. Homes without security systems are reported to be three times more likely to be broken into, and suffer
greater losses when they are broken into. See id. ("Independent studies show that a
homeowner is 3 to 6 times less likely to be burglarized than homes without security
systems; Losses due to burglary average $400 less in residences with security systems than for a residence without security systems.").
131. See, e.g.,
Bill Dries, Readers Sound Off on False Alarm Fines and Firms, COM.
APPFAL, Sept. 15, 1997, at Al ("The latest local [Memphis, Tennessee] statistics
show 98 percent of the 125,000 burglar alarm calls police answered last year were
false alarms.").
132. See The Model Cities Program,supra note 130 (noting support of National
Burglar and Fire Alarm Association for imposition of fines for false alarms as part
of effective false alarm reduction plan).
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ices are not covered or if the insurer loses its patience after too many false
alarms.
A benign explanation for the fundamental inconsistency between the
way in which our society handles false burglar alarms and false ED alarms
is that it reflects a difference in the stakes. Yet, burglaries can result in
severe financial losses, and home invasions can result in death or permanent disability. A more plausible explanation is that the costs of false burglar alarms are an on-budget expense (and the reform moves them offbudget), while the government bears only a modest percentage of the cost
of false ED alarms and the consumer protections it enacts.
This point deserves some additional elaboration because the consensus view seems to be that the federal and state governments are necessarily
honest brokers of disputes between MCOs, providers and plan beneficiaries. Unfortunately, as a historical matter, governmental resistance to
rent-seeking behavior has been dismal at best. 133 The government's record in dealing with externalities is little better.' 3 4 It is certainly true that if
133. Space considerations preclude a full review of this topic, but highlights
would include the tax preferences and transitional tax rules that riddle the Internal Revenue Code-and coincidentally happen to favor the wealthy and well connected. See, e.g., Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 702 F. Supp.
1285, 1287-89 (N.D. Tex. 1988), affjd, 964 F.2d 1556 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc
granted, 974 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 987 F.2d 1174 (5th

Cir. 1993) (en banc) (reviewing legislative history indicating preferential transitional tax treatment of certain individuals and industries with access to influential
members of Congress); JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT
Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM

6-17, 240-43 (1988) (reviewing tax preferences granted to all and sundry but disproportionately to those with political influence; even tax reform bill had favorable
transitional rules and tax breaks for favored few); Glenn R. Simpson, Pizza Makers'
Success on Tax Break Reveals a Slice of PoliticalLife, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 9, 1996, at Al
(noting that home delivery "pizza moguls" secured tax break that softens impact of
increase in minimum wage laws).
And what of "corporate welfare"? Several governmental programs confer private benefit without corresponding societal benefit and come with price tags of
almost $100 billion per year. See Stephen Moore, How to Slash Corporate Welfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at A25 (listing "eight of the most egregious examples of corporate welfare in the federal budget"). These governmental programs include Sematech; sugar price supports; subsidies to the electric utilities, the timber industry,
the Department of Agriculture's market promotion program, the advanced technology program and clean car initiative; and tax breaks for companies producing
ethanol. See id.; see also Corporate Welfare: Hearing Before the Committee on the Budget,
104 Cong. 20 (1996) (statement of Robert Greenstein, Executive Director, Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities) (expressing concern that "not much has been
done in corporate welfare"); GARY MUCCIARONI, REVERSALS OF FORTUNE:

PUBLIC

POLICY AND PRIVATE INTERESTS 1 (1995) (noting rise and fall of favored groups with

subsidies delivered through preferential tax treatment, anticompetitive regulation,
trade barrier and price supports); MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 207-36 (1985) (examining effects of regulation and deregu-

lation on "natural gas pricing, air pollution control, wages paid on federally
supported construction projects, milk marketing, and ocean shipping").
134. As with the previous topic, space considerations preclude a complete review. Commerce Clause litigation provides numerous examples of the routine
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men were angels, no government would be necessary, but one should not
therefore conclude that the government is populated by angels-particularly in the face of considerable empirical evidence to the contrary. In
short, the government is not a neutral party when it comes to these matters-especially when it is enlisted by providers to create or enforce a cartel, in which event most of the surplus is likely to be captured by those
same providers.
VI.

WHERE Do WE

Go

FROM HERE?

It is one thing to identify weaknesses in proffered reforms, but quite
another to argue that the current situation cannot be improved.13 5 Consumers are weak, ignorant, poor and disorganized, and their ability to get
the terms they want is limited by ERISA, their bounded rationality and
their limited ability to "shop around." When these limitations are coupled
with the agency problems induced by employer-based insurance, the case
136
for aggressive consumer protection regulation seems self-evident.
preference for in-state interests over out-of-state interests. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 1608 (1997) (finding
unconstitutional Maine statute granting property tax exemption with value keyed
to percentage of participating children from in-state); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981) (upholding Minnesota statute requiring
that milk be sold in paper cartons, which was enacted to serve interests of local
dairies and in-state pulp manufacturers at expense of other dairies and out-of-state
plastic manufacturers); City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978)
(finding restrictions imposed by New Jersey on out-of-state garbage unconstitutional); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54
(1977) (holding discrimination against out-of-state apples unconstitutional).
And what of crop subsidies, including those secured by those masters of the
art, the dairy industry? See Scott Kilman, Inside the Byzantine World of Milk Prices,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1997, at BI. Kilman noted that
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) helped tag onto the 1996 farm bill approval
for a six-state New England milk-price compact. Because the compact
essentially flouts the constitutional protection of interstate commerce, it
required congressional approval. Called the Northeast Interstate Dairy
Compact, it insures that cheap Midwest milk doesn't undercut local producers' prices by pricing all milk the same ....For the average Vermont
dairy farmer, the compact is putting about $1,000 more a month into the
bank. New England shoppers, meanwhile, are paying collectively about
$5 million more for milk monthly, Public Voice figures .... Now, state
lawmakers and milk lobbyists elsewhere are rushing to follow New England's example.
Id.
135. SeeJohn Shepard WileyJr., A CaptureTheory ofAntitrust Federalism: Reply to
Professors Page and Spitzer, 61 S.CAL. L. REv. 1327, 1339 (1988) ("To rest content
with identifying flaws in policy suggestions, however, indulges the nirvana fallacy.
The motif of policy debates should not be whether a proposal is perfect but
whether it beats the alternatives in improving the status quo.").
136. See KAREN DAVIS & CATHY SCHOEN, MANAGED CARE, CHOICE, AND PATIENT
SATISFACTION, (visited Mar. 1, 1997) <http://www.cmwf.org/health-care/satis.
html> (discussing limited health plan options offered to employees);Julie Kosterlitz, Unmanaged Care?, 26 NAT'LJ. 2903, 2905 (1994) ("[M]any people don't have a

choice of health plans. According to a survey by the accounting and employee
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Unfortunately, as Part V suggests, matters are not so simple. 137 As an
empirical proposition, if the consumer protections outlined in Part III are
so important, how does one explain the striking lack of evidence indicating that those enrolled in self-funded ERISA plans (where there is effectively no substantive regulation) are any more unhappy with their
insurance than those enrolled in plans that are aggressively regulated at
the state level? 138 One would have thought such evidence would be immebenefits consulting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick, 45 per cent [sic] of Americans
who get their health insurance through their employers are offered only one
plan."); Robin Toner, Harry and Louise Were Right, Sort Of N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 24,
1996, at 4:1 ("[A]mong mid-size employers, 52 percent now offer their workers
only one plan."). Davis and Schoan elaborated on the limited choices available to
American workers:
Based on preliminary data from the 1997 Kaiser/Commonwealth National
Health Insurance Survey, 40 percent of those currently employed are working for an employer who offers a choice of plans. An equal proportion
have only one plan. One out of six (17 percent) have no plans offered
through their employer. Full-time employees are the most likely to have
a choice.
The choice available to a given worker, however, does not necessarily
reflect the degree of choice available to the family. Taking into account
plans offered by a spouse's employer, as well, 52 percent of working age
adults (age 18 to 64) who are employed (or have an employed spouse)
have a choice of plans....
Often the choice of plans provided by employers does not include a
fee-for-service (FFS) plan. More than one out of four workers (28 percent) say that their employers do not offer "a plan that will pay when you
see any doctor you want."
DAvis & SCHOAN, supra.
Even when employers offer multiple plans, their preference structure appears,
in some instances, to differ from that of their employees. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of
Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 1037, 1055-57
(1996) (noting empirical evidence suggesting variety of differences between employers' and employees' health insurance preferences); see also Hoffman, supra
note 70, at 350-51 (discussing reasons why employers do not always make decisions
regarding health plans with employees' best interests in mind). Of course, there
are other arguments in favor of consumer protection, including the risk of exploitation and the externalities that can result from limited coverage.
137. As H.L. Mencken observed, "[f]or every complex problem, there is a
solution which is simple, elegant, . . . and wrong. . .

."

Mark A. Hall & John D.

Columbo, The CharitableStatus of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax
Exemption, 66 WASH L. REv. 307, 330 n.76 (1991). Other versions of the same aphorism are readily available. See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 264 n.6
(5th Cir. 1981) ("For every complex problem, there is usually a simple answerand it's usually wrong."); United States v. McCoy, 32 M.J. 906, 909 (A.F.C.M.R.
1991) ("For every complex problem there is a simple solution ... and it is usually
wrong."); Bing v. Florida, 492 So. 2d 833, 835 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("For
every complex problem there is a solution that is short, simple and wrong.").
138. Even if there were such evidence, a complete assessment of the issue
requires consideration of the offsetting benefits received by the policyholders from
the existence of the self-funded plan as such. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) ("[T] he detailed provisions of §502(a) [of ERISA] set forth
a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of
the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest
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13 9
diately at hand if the problems are as severe as is commonly believed.
Absent such evidence, those arguing for across-the-board consumer protections should be required to provide a great deal of evidence about the
merits of each incremental reform, as well as some insight into their ulti40
mate objective.

But what if there are such problems in the health insurance market?
The correct response to that observation is a further question: Does regulatory intervention offer a solution or will it create a different (and potentially worse) set of problems? 4 1 In drafting consumer protections, there
in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.") (emphasis added).
Employers need not offer any coverage at all, but there are distinct advantages-lower search costs, less expensive coverage, compensation for bounded rationality-in securing group coverage through employment. See Matthew, supra
note 135, at 1042-45 (examining several advantages of employment-based health
coverage). Even half a loaf is better than none-and participants in ERISA plans
receive a great deal more than half a loaf. To be sure, there are always trade-offs
within the common pool because the demand for health care varies in ways that
are generally predictable along a number of parameters, including age, race and
sex. Because insurance only shifts and spreads risk for which the policy provides
coverage, the specification of such coverage necessarily implies a series of tradeoffs within the common pool, with significant distributional implications within
and across identifiable groups. Although legislative mandates can reallocate resources within the common pool, they do not create resources, and the new services are covered at the expense of something else, or of increased premiums or
both.
139. For a discussion of complaints about managed care, see supranote 3 and
accompanying text.
140. At the federal level, there is no mistaking the desires of the administration. One commentator observed that although the Clinton administration was
only proposing consumer protection,
the President made clear that the old impulses, the yearning for health
security for all, are just below the surface. "There is," he said, "an emerging consensus that while people may not have wanted to bite the whole
apple at once in 1994, almost the whole population wants to keep nibbling away at the apple until we actually have solved the problems of cost,
accessibility and quality for all responsible American citizens."
Pear, supra note 48, at A18. Although one naturally wonders how these problems
will be solved by making coverage more expensive, a substantial percentage of
Congress seems inclined to go along, if only to avoid being tarred as anticonsumer
protection. See id. (noting approval by one-third of congressional Republicans of
Clinton's proposed legislation). But see Dick Armey, Socialized Medicine on the Installment Plan, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at A26 (opposing consumer protection
initiative); Eric Weissenstein, Word from Washington: The Ghost of ClintonCare: In
Fight Against Managed-CareRegulation, Republicans Return to Successful Theme, MoD.
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 17, 1997, at 36 (noting opposition of business groups, managed
care organizations and some Republicans to consumer protection legislation).
If we are to adopt universal coverage, it should be after a debate on the merits
of that proposal (which its proponents have lost each and every time it has been
raised) rather than by slouching toward a national health plan.
141. The problem was wryly summarized by a long-time (but now former, and
until recently, incarcerated) Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee:
"Fundamental reform almost always runs the risk of making things worse." Flat
Tax Proposals Before the Senate Finance Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of
Sheldon D. Pollack) (quoting Daniel Rostenkowski); see also Judith Miller, Selling
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is little guarantee that the legislature will actually target the right problem
because its selection is heavily influenced by bad anecdotes and perceived
public appeal.' 42 Even if the legislature fortuitously picks a reasonable
target today, there is no guarantee it will do so tomorrow. 143 "Mom and
apple pie" legislation, of which consumer protection against managed
care is clearly an example, is particularly prone to legislative posturing and
overreaching.1 44 Even if there is an agency problem with employer-based
the Government Like Soap: It Seems to Work, N.Y.

TIMES,

Sept. 14, 1997, at 4:3 (noting

that President Reagan liked to observe "that possibly the biggest lie in the English
language was: 'Hi, I'm from the Federal Government and I'm here to help you."').

142. The history of the gag clause controversy is particularly revealing on this
point. After condemnation of such clauses by every member of Congress who
spoke on the subject, the General Accounting Office determined that there were
no true gag clauses in any of the 1,150 contracts they examined-and the majority
of the contracts included express statements that any provisions included therein
were not intended to prevent or limit discussions between physician and patient.
See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 97-175, MANAGED CARE: ExPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN

HMO CONTRACTS,

BUT

PHYSICIAN CONCERNS

(1997). Opponents of managed care also have yet to produce a single true
gag clause-and the antidisparagement and commercial secrecy clauses on which
they have focused are common in many, contracts. Even if a true gag clause had
been included, there is plenty of evidence indicating that parties to a contract will
frequently ignore contractual rights to maintain reputational interests. See, e.g.,
Daniel Keating, MeasuringSales Law Against Sales Contracts: A Reality Check, 17J. L.
& COMM. (forthcoming 1998) (observing that concern for reputation is greater
restraint than contractual terms). More to the point, in a market where MCOs can
terminate providers at will, they hardly need a gag clause.
The controversies over the appropriateness of drive-through deliveries and
the desirability of routine mammograms for women in their forties are other examples of the same phenomenon. See generally Hyman, supra note 22; see also
Steven H. Woolf & Robert S. Lawrence, PreservingScientific Debate and PatientChoice:
Lessons from the Consensus Panel on Mammography Screening, 278 JAMA 2105, 2107
REMAIN

(1997) (recounting congressional pressure to revise consensus panel recommendation and stating that congressional "positions, influenced by ballot concerns and
special interests, can misinform the public and can assume the power of law, effectively taking decisions out of the hands of patients and physicians").

143. See Goodman, supra note 70, at 10A. As Mr. Goodman pointed out,
[a] lot is at stake here. One silly regulation invariably leads to many
more. Bowing to special-interest pressures, state legislatures already are
forcing insurers to pay for services ranging from acupuncture to in vitro
fertilization. Insurers must pay for hairpieces in Minnesota, marriage
counseling in California and pastoral counseling in Vermont.
Id.; see also ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 437-39 (1996) (reviewing mandates). Another commentator observed that
[1] egislating a two-day minimum maternity stay will raise health insurance
costs by just a fraction of 1 percent. The real danger here is the precedent in an era of tight government budgets. Elected officials who cannot
please constituents with additional spending or tax cuts still have the option of currying favor by mandating private benefits. And as long as there
is a plausible rationale along with emotional appeal, minimum-benefit
creep will be hard to resist.
Passell, supra note 110, at D2.
144. See Kassirer, PracticingMedicine, supra note 60, at 1747 ("This is decision
making by emotional and opportunistic concensus.") The problem is worsened

because the costs of such efforts are largely off-budget. See Goodman, supra note
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insurance, it is a mathematical certainty that the agency problem is worse
if one regulates at the state level-let alone the federal level.
Similarly, although they are usually off-budget, consumer protection
regulations are not free. 1 45 Their costs are borne by consumers in the
form of higher premiums or lesser coverage-or both.1 4 6 In short, one
70, atA10 ("[S]pare us the spectacle of craven, vote-seeking politicians kowtowing
to people who want to have their cake and eat it, too.") The debates over the
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection and Mental Health Parity Acts reflected similar behavior. See 142 CONG. REc. S9903-25 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996).
The problem is obviously not unique to health care. See generally David A. Hyman,
WMen Bad Laws Happen to Good People: The Case Against A Duty to Rescue (Feb. 1997)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (collecting examples). Environmental law is particularly prone to such symbolic legislation. As Professor Dwyer
has noted,
[m]ost regulatory statutes instruct agencies to balance competing concerns in setting standards. Some regulatory statutes, however, impose
short deadlines and stringent standard-setting criteria that are designed
to address a single, overriding concern to the exclusion of other factors ....

The programs mandated by such legislation are more symbolic

than functional. Frequently, the legislature has failed to address the administrative and political constraints that will block implementation of
the statute. By enacting this type of statute, legislators reap the political
benefit of voting . . . against "trading lives for dollars," and successfully
sidestep the difficult policy choices ....
John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 233
(1990).
145. When Congress extends consumer protections to the Medicare and (to a
lesser extent) Medicaid populations, it bears the costs of its decisions. As described previously, a variety of consumer protections have been implemented in
the Medicare and Medicaid markets-and a number of commentators have suggested that other health plans should follow this lead. Although Congress has
clearly indicated that it believes such protections are costjustified, the troubled
financial status of the Medicare program might cause one to wonder about the
advisability of following Congress' lead. Indeed, one must wonder how serious
Congress is about the costs of its reforms when the bipartisan "solution" to Medicare's financial woes was to move home health care from Part A (funded through a
special tax) to Part B (largely funded through general revenues), thus deferring
the bankruptcy of the Part A trust fund for a few additional years, but doing nothing whatsoever about the overall cost of the program.
When states have passed consumer protections, they have been known to exclude Medicaid managed care beneficiaries and state employees from their protections-and the only thing these groups have in common is that the state bears
some or all of the costs of the protections it extends. See generally Hyman, supra
note 22.
146. See Ornstein, supra note 4, at A15. As Mr. Ornstein has observed,
if Congress, the president, business and the public want to see costs restrained, and if journalists want to present a complete and accurate picture, they all have to recognize that there is no free lunch here. Even
after more efficiencies and lower rates of return for HMOs, every procedure that Congress requires insurance companies to provide means a cost
trim somewhere else, through lower doctor or hospital fees or another
procedure denied.
Id.
A specific numerical example is found in the Congressional Budget Office's
(CBO's) report on the estimated impact of the Newborns' and Mothers' Health
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does not get something for nothing, even from an insurance company.
More generally, cost-quality trade-offs must be faced within and across
every field of human enterprise. Regulations that hide those choices or
(not so) arbitrarily pick a uniformly expensive floor do no one any favors-least of all those who are priced out of the market entirely. The
usual response-that health is priceless-is of little help in a world of scarcity. Cost must always be considered, and those for whom price is no object are never those who ultimately foot the bill.
Finally, calling a statute "consumer protection" is no guarantee that it
will actually accomplish that end. 147 When statutes are proposed and
backed by those who provide the mandated services, it is a safe first approximation that any consumer benefit is largely incidental-and frequently nonexistent.1 48 This is not to say that true consumer protection
Protection Act of 1996, which prohibited drive-through deliveries:
CBO estimates that the proposal would initially raise private group health
insurance premiums by about 0.06 percent. In response, employers and
employees would reduce coverage or drop benefits for other services. Because of these reductions, we assume that employer contributions for
health insurance would rise by only 0.02 percent. Most of that increase
would be passed back to employees in lower wage.
S. REP. No. 104-326, at 12 (1996); see Laura Meckler, Medical Mandates Carry Price,
Experts Tell Nation's Lawmakers, CHATrANOOGA TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at D3 (noting
costs associated with mandated coverage).
147. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Scr. 3 (1971) ("[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit."); Fred S. McChesney, Commercial
Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable
Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 98 n. 210 (1985) ("[S]kepticism about the stated
public-interest purposes of licensing goes back at least as far as Adam Smith.").
148. SeeJack M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 275, 291-92 (1989).
Professor Balkin noted,
[t] he rationale of every governmental action almost always has a nice version and a naughty version.... The "nice" version of the Filled Milk Act,
for example, is that the bill was designed as a paternalistic measure to
prevent uneducated and even illiterate consumers from purchasing a less
expensive but less nutritious substitute for milk and cream ....
On the
other hand, the rationale of the Filled Milk Act also has a naughty version
.... It is not too uncharitable, perhaps, to suggest that concern for the
dairies' pocketbooks rather than for the consumer's health best explains
the dairy lobby's efforts. In fact, though the filled milk legislation seemed to be
aimed at helping consumers, it may have harmed them. They were "saved"from
"adulterated"products, but only at the cost of higher prices, while the dairy industry benefitted from reduced competition.
Id. (emphasis added). Even licensing creates similar opportunities for misbehavior. As Professor Gellhorn observed:
Of course many special interests perceive themselves as nurturers of the
public interest rather than as self-seekers. The line between the common
weal and one's own is not always easily drawn. But occupational licensing
has typically brought higher status for the producer of services at the
price of higher costs to the consumer; it has reduced competition; it has
narrowed opportunity for aspiring youth by increasing the costs of entry
into a desired occupational career; it has artificially segmented skills so
that needed services, like health care, are increasingly difficult to supply
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legislation must necessarily hurt the interests of all providers, but the systematic demonization of MCOs and the deification of fee-for-service providers provide some clues about the identity of the true beneficiaries of the
legislation described in Part III.
One need not have much of a conspiratorial bent to view the "attacks
by anecdote" outlined in Part II as part of an ongoing "Astroturf' lobbying
campaign against managed care orchestrated by disaffected and unemployed or underemployed health care providers. 149 These groups have
spent considerable effort collecting and popularizing managed care horror stories. 150 Their tactics are consistent, regardless of the underlying
economically; it has fostered the cynical view that unethical practices will
prevail unless those entrenched in a profession are assured of high incomes; and it has caused a proliferation of official administrative bodies,
most of them staffed by persons drawn from and devoted to furthering
the interests of the licensed occupations themselves.... Only the credulous can conclude that licensure is in the main intended to protect the
public rather than those who have been licensed or, perhaps in some
instances, those who do the licensing.
Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of OccupationalLicensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 16-18, 25
(1976).
149. See Lisa Belkin, But What About Quality?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at 6:68
(noting that managed care is being judged by "attack by anecdote"); Stuart
Auerbach, Managed Care Backlash: As the Marketplace Changes, Consumers Are Caught
in the Middle, WASH. PosT, June 25, 1996, at Z12 ("Patients who feel wronged by the
system have joined in a potent lobby with doctors, nurses, hospitals and other
health care providers whose professional survival, incomes and long-held practice
patterns are threatened by managed care."); Olmos & Roan, supra note 34, at Al,
("[M]anaged care officials see the onslaught of legislation as a "public relations
ploy" by medical groups unhappy with the growing influence of managed care
over their profession.").
"Astroturf lobbying" allows a group to present its position as a grass roots campaign, regardless of the actual degree of public concern. See Elizabeth Kolbert,
Special Interests' Special Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at 20 ("They look like
grass-roots movements but are actually campaigns manufactured by special interest ....
They are called 'Astroturf.'"); They Don't Want Your Input; They Just Want
Your Name; Astroturf Lobbying Creates Phony 'Grass Roots, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 31, 1995,

at F6 ("Astroturf lobbying is simply fake "grass-roots" pressure ....

A typical tactic

is to hire phone solicitors to call unsuspecting citizens, read them a misleading
description of a bill and then ask if they wouldn't like to do the equivalent of
supporting motherhood or opposing Satan."). For an account of an Astroturf
campaign that backfired, see David Segal, The Tale of The Bogus Telegrams, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 1995, at Al.
150. See Auerbach, supra note 149, at Z12 ("[A] cottage industry has developed to solicit patients who have bad experiences with managed care and market
their stories to the press, television, state legislatures, and Congress."); Physicians
Who Care, The HMO Page (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.hmopage.org> (announcing "Managed Care Atrocity of the Month," posting "Managed Care Hall of
Shame" and soliciting additional managed care related stories); Physicians Who
Care, Physicians Who Care in Action (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.pwc.org/
summer97/art4.html> ("Physicians Who Care members continue to be active in
providing HMO horror stories to the media, giving interviews to newspaper and
magazine reporters, as well as appearing on radio and television shows."); Consumer Coalition for Quality Health Care, The Quality Watchline (visited Mar. 1,
1998) <http://www.consumers.org/wline.htm> (announcing Consumer Coalition
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issue. Economic constraints are assailed for interfering with the doctorpatient relationship. Favored but costly treatments are labeled "safe" and
"appropriate," while disfavored cut-rate treatments are tarred as "unsafe"
and "inappropriate." The implied appeal to absolute safety is a dodge; the
real issue is how much relative risk should be self-insured and how much
should be socialized. 151 The use of the term "appropriate" is equally disingenuous: "Who, after all, can be found to stand up for 'inappropriate'
15 2
treatment or actions of any sort?"
There is no question that managed care poses some hazards for its
customers, but so does fee-for-service medicine. More generally, any
agency relationship has inherent and inescapable conflicts of interest.
These conflicts can be made better or worse by the system of compensation that is employed, the significance and half-life of reputational interests, the ability to recover for misbehavior and the nature of the agency
relationship (one-shot or repeated). Nevertheless, agents will never be
principals. As such, efforts to enact consumer protection reforms in managed care, when their conspicuous absence was tolerated in fee-for-service
medicine, should be approached with a jaundiced eye. The government
has no business picking sides in the trench warfare that some providers are
waging against managed care-let alone doing so under the guise of consumer protection. The overwhelming urge to "get in there and do the
right thing" should be tempered by the repeatedly validated knowledge
that regulatory intervention frequently has the opposite result.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to federal law, cigarettes carry an explicit warning that they
are hazardous to one's health. As yet, the surgeon general has not had
anything to say about the perils of managed care, but it may just be a
matter of time-particularly because the only industry with a worse reputafor Quality Health Care's toll-free phone number and e-mail address to report
complaints about managed care).
Many of those espousing consumer protection claims are provider groups,
who clearly have their own interests at stake. See, e.g., Consumer Coalition for Quality Health Care, ParticipatingOrganizations,(visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.consumers.org/members.htm> (listing provider groups who support consumer
coalition).
151. Cf Victor Cohn, Vaccines and Risks: The Responsibility of the Media, Scientists, and Clinicians, 276JAMA 1917, 1918 (1996) ("I believe we should all refrain
from invoking the overused word 'safe.' ... Almost nothing is completely safe, and
we should officially and individually consider substituting 'relatively safe' or 'as safe
as possible,' and indicating, in the best numbers and rates we can muster, the
degree of safety or risk.").
152. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir.
1990); see also Thomas L. Shaffer & Julia B. Meister, Is This Appropriate?, 46 DUKE

L.J. 781, 781 (1997) ("The word 'appropriate' is so wildly overused in American

culture that, as with other vacuous words and phrases, a person learns to read right
through it. 'Appropriate' is verbal tofu.").
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tion than managed care is tobacco. 153 Yet "attack by anecdote" provides
no basis with which to assess the overall merits and inadequacies of a system with hundreds of millions of annual encounters between health care
providers and patients. 154 Even if the complaints in Part II are accurate,
representative and frequent, such complaints provide no evidence that
consumers are actually prepared to pay the necessary amounts to solve
155
these problems.
Consumer protection against managed care looks like an easy winner
15 6
for media-savvy politicians-who, after all, likes insurance companies?
Yet, even if there are problems with managed care or particular managed
care providers, it does not follow that consumer protection statutes can
effectively solve such problems without inducing offsetting distortions or
providing undue opportunities for rent-seeking. Even when each piece of
incremental regulation is positioned as a necessary reform, the costs (both
on- and off-budget) add up quickly. The result of such initiatives is restricted choice at a higher cost-an outcome that hardly serves consumers' interests. 157 One could object that health care is special-but even if
it is, the important question is whether regulation leads to better coverage
design than voluntary arrangements, all things considered-including
153. See Louise Kertesz, HMO Makeover: Are Managed Care's Efforts to Overhaul
Its Image Too Little, Too Late?, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 12, 1997, at 36 ("In a survey
released by the public relations firm Porter/Novelli in February 1996, only 10% of
consumers thought .the managed-care industry was 'believable.' That placed it a
notch above the tobacco industry."); Lee Bowman, Americans Don't Like or Understand HMOs: Many Don't Even Realize They're Enrolled in One, RocKy MTN. NEws,
June 29, 1997, at 9G ("[A]n expert on public attitudes toward health care, cited a
recent Harris poll that asked people which groups 'do a good job in serving consumers.' Only 51 percent said HMOs and managed care companies did a good
job, ahead only of tobacco companies, which got approval from 34 percent.").
154. Although their use of anecdotes suggests otherwise, even the advocates
of consumer protection seem to agree. See Serafini, supra note 9, at 2283 ("Even
while unleashing numerous horror-story anecdotes, the authors of the Families
USA study advise caution. An individual story cannot and should not be used...
[as] the sole basis upon which new, far-reaching laws are legislated.").
155. See Milt Freudenheim, Many H.M.O. 's Easing Rules On Seeking Specialists'
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1:1 ("Dr. Friesen conceded that his group's patients 'love our price, they love our doctors, but they hate the referral process.' He
questioned, though, whether the patients were ready to pay for a change. '[F]or
$80 a month, [they want] access to networks that would cost $200 a month.'"); see
also E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospectsfor "PuttingAmerica to
Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003, 2047 n. 180 (1993) ("In a 1987... [p]oll,
71% of respondents agreed with the statement that 'the government in Washington should see to it that everyone who wants ajob has ajob.'... The high support
level, however, tells us little about how much Americans would be willing to pay to
accomplish this goal.").
156. Cf Randall R. Bovbjerg, Liability and Liability Insurance: Chicken and Egg,
Destructive Spiral, or Risk and Reaction?, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1655, 1655 (1994) ("Something there is that doesn't love an insurer.").
157. For a discussion of consumer preference for wide selection of health
plans, see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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price. 158 Unfortunately, the usual approach of regulators is to take a
"health is special," "price is no object" and "nothing but the best" view of
the coverage market-a wonderfully egalitarian, but wholly unrealistic
view of the situation. 159 The more special health care is, the more important it is to not make things worse than they already are by opting for the
60
wrong uniform solution.'
What then should be done? As always, the government must prevent
force, fraud and duress. 16 ' The government should also encourage the
development of better measures for assessing the quality of the health care
16 2
that is actually delivered-including its impact on clinical outcomes.
There are also a number of nonglamorous things that the state and fed158. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why is Health Care Special?, 40 U. KAN. L. REv.
307, 311 (1992) (stating that health care is not special); Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical
Care Different? Old Questions, New Answers, 13J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 227, 23536 (1988) (stating that maybe health care is special, but only very little); Rand E.
Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1067, 110913 (1981) (stating that health care is special); Timothy StoltzfusJost, The Necessary
andProperRole of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REv. 525,
535-58 (1988) (stating that it is special, but only in some areas).
159. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Uncompensated Hospital Care, in UNCOMPENSATED
HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1, 11 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds.,
1986) ("The champions of the poor, and the poor themselves must recognize that,
in the political and budgetary climate of the 1980s [and 1990s], pursuit of the
maxim 'for the poor, nothing but the best' may leave the poor with nothing.").
Professor Siliciano noted similar difficulties with the impact of tort law on access to
medical care:
Tort law instructs health care providers to treat the poor the same as the
rich, but then blithely ignores the fundamental impact that resource scarcity and the provider's freedom to refuse care to the poor have on the
efficacy of its command ....
By embracing the chimera of equality between the rich the poor, [tort law] effectively disables health care providers from offering reasonable, low-cost care to large numbers of the
medically indigent. Thus, through its adherence to the unitary ideal, tort
law may end up killing the poor with an unthinking and misguided
kindness.
John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary MalpracticeStandard, 77 VA. L. REv.
439, 486-87 (1991).
160. See Epstein, supra note 158, at 311. As Professor Epstein has observed,
[i]nstead the importance, so to speak, of importance is simple: it is important to get the right set of solutions, be it private or public, to the
problem at hand. Importance does not create a presumption in favor of
government, or for that matter against it. It only raises the stakes for
making a correct decision in the matter at hand.
Id.
161. In the health insurance context, fraud would include promising broad
ED coverage (and collecting premiums on that basis) and then delivering more
restrictive coverage, as well as refusing to pay if care was pre-authorized, without
regard to whether there was a true emergency. It would not, however, include
promising narrow ED coverage and delivering the same, or placing restrictions on
access to the ED.
162. See Robert H. Brook, Managed CareIs Not the Problem, Quality Is, 278JAMA
1612 (1997) (arguing that failure to address quality of care is real problem with
modern medicine and health policy).
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eral legislatures could do to enhance the operation of the health insurance market. These reforms would include the leveling (preferably down,
but more likely up) of the tax consequences of purchasing health insurance in the employer-based and nonemployer-based markets; unrestricted
access to medical savings accounts for those who wish to purchase them;
the repeal of community rating, genetic antidiscrimination provisions and
similar impediments to true risk-based insurance; broader availability of
large group coverage for those currently covered in the individual and
small-group markets; the elimination of EMTALA's protections for those
who are insured and the expansion of the ERISA free-fire zone to encompass all group health insurance plans.163 To the extent the government
feels absolutely compelled to directly regulate in these areas, it should
64
limit itself to disclosure-oriented provisions.'
163. A full explanation of the reasons for each of these true reforms would
occupy another article. Instead, I limit my comments to the reform most applicable to the subject of the paper, the repeal of EMTALA for those who are insured.
As outlined in an earlier article, the case for repealing EMTALA for the insured is
as follows:
[i] nstead of adding an additional layer of laws to fix the problems created
by EMTALA, why not get rid of EMTALA in the first place, at least for
those Who are insured? Once this is done, MCOs will not be able to impose costs on hospitals, and the insurance market will be free to seek the
level of coverage for emergency care demanded by its customers. MCO
members will be able to pick a plan that provides the level of coverage
they want, and make their own trade-offs in the Benefit/Cost No Man's
Land. The likely increase in self-insurance will also lower the rate of inappropriate ED utilization. Coverage will probably end up looking nothing
like that implicit in the 'consumer protection' bills ... but isn't that one
of the benefits of having a voluntary insurance market?
Hyman, supra note 63, at 68.
For more background on the Cost/Benefit No-Man's Land, see Clark Havighurst, ContractFailurein the Marketfor Health Serices, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 47, 51-

54 (1994); Clark Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with. Quality/Cost Tradeoffs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6, 17 (1975).
164. Of course, disclosure-oriented provisions are not perfect. One commentator has noted some of the difficulties:
At its core, the true market failure we are experiencing in health benefits
is that (1) a growing number of Americans face restricted choices in
health care; (2) those Americans lack the ability to determine whether
the effect of those restrictions will be harmful to their health; and (3)
they do not automatically trust either health plans or providers to act in
their best interest in the emerging market environment. Short of a legislated reversion to the status quo ante of, say, 1975, it is unclear how government action could address these concerns. While government could, in
theory, purport to address the problem through information-related regulation, it is difficult to visualize the information that would be needed to
materially affect public confidence on so fundamental a question. We
could, of course, bury consumers in 'a pile of descriptive information
about health plans, their provider networks, and their performance
against various objective measures. Even if consumers were willing to
wade through the pile, however, the vast majority would find the information ambiguous at best.... Although it is tempting to think that governmental efforts could be directed to manufacturing answers to all known
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As for the rest, leaving well enough alone is likely to be sufficient unto
the day. 165 As the modest example of consumer protection outlined in
this paper establishes, any given rule or standard for handling problems
with managed care has imperfections. The determination of the right mix
of premium, health care services (preventative, nonurgent, urgent and
emergent) and administrative expense is hardly self-evident, even without
factoring in the agency, error and incentive costs. 166 Despite the many
imperfections that dog the health insurance system, the market is likely to
provide a better long-term solution to these trade-offs than any of the alternatives. 16 7 Voluntary credentialing, employer-driven report cards and
other rating initiatives happened without regulatory coercion, and reputation is always important in a repeat-business market.' 6 8 Even imperfect
clinical controversies, it is naive to believe that the American people
would trust the outcome of such a process any more than they trust capitated health plans and providers.
Moran, supra 58, at 20-21.
165. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 210, 215 ("Well, then, what can we do? By and large, nothing. If you
don't know what is best, let people make their own arrangements .... 'Better'
terms (as buyers see things) support higher prices, and sellers have as much reason
to offer the terms consumers prefer (that is, the terms that consumers find costjustified) as to offer any other ingredient of their products.").
166. Indeed, as Alfred Kahn, former chairman of the long-since abolished
Civil Aeronautics Board noted, "the superiority of open markets ... lies in the fact
that the optimum outcome cannot be predicted." DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 132,
at 124. That observation is of particular significance when consumer preferences
are heterogeneous, and the coverage market is offering bundled products.
167. SeeJohnson & Derlet, supra note 64, at 139-41 (listing various alternatives
for EDs in managed care world); J. Stephan Stapczynski, Capitationfor Emergency

Physicians,27 ANNALS

EMERGENCY MED.

501, 503-04 (1996) (stating that EDs should

experiment with providing after-hours coverage on capitated basis for MCO members); The ChallengeforManaged Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1997, atA26 (noting that
innovative MCOs are developing ways to handle various chronic illnesses); Milt
Freudenheim, H.M.0. Switches to FlatFeefor Treatment by Specialists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1997, at Al (identifying move by HMO to charge set fee for specialist treatment
as "sharp departure from industry practice"); Freudenheim, supra note 155, at Al
(noting increase in freedom to seek care by specialist offered by HMOs); Bruce
Goldfarb, Shopping for Triage, BALTIMORE MAG., Feb. 1996, at 56, 58-59 (reviewing
development of specialized EDs); Ron Winslow, Oxford to Give More Control to Specialists, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1997, at BI (examining decision by Oxford to treat
certain patients with specialists not primary-care physicians).
The market also provides a valuable feedback device that is lacking in other

institutional arrangements. See

REGINA

E.

HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH

CARE 283-91 (1997) (arguing that only providers and MCOs that provide high-

quality product at reasonable price with good service will survive in market-driven
world); Reed Abelson, Behind the Bleeding at Oxford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at Di
(noting that innovative MCO may well have been too innovative, judging by complaints about unpaid bills).
168. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 97, at 3:1. As this article reflects,
information, from disinterested sources, patient surveys and hard-knocks
experience, is growing significantly, a result in part of the concern of the
more responsible and established segments of the managed care industry, which have helped fund much of the work. . . . [A] ccreditation
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markets develop effective mechanisms to inform, protect and serve consumers, and those MCOs that are overly aggressive in constraining ED access relative to the balance of coverage and the premium they charge should bear
the consequences. Nothing keeps an MCO from packaging itself as particularly virtuous-particularly in light of the growing diversification of the
MCO market. 169 In short, competition can result in innovative solutions
that differ dramatically from the consumer protection remedy, but are
pareto superior.
It is no answer to point to isolated examples that have gone wrong,
because there will always be such cases. 170 The trade-off between adminissurveys are [also] a good basis for measuring plans' performance. The
surveys, which are voluntary, are conducted by impartial professional organizations like the National Committee for Quality Assurance.
Id.; see How Good Is Your Health Plan?, CONSUMER REP., Aug., 1996, at 28, 35 (ranking plans). But see Arnold Epstein, Performance Reports on Quality-Prototypes,
Problems, and Prospects, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 57, 60 (1996) (noting various
problems with report cards); George Anders, Polling Quirks Give HMOs Healthy Rating WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at BI (noting that survey techniques influence
results of polls testing health plan satisfaction).
169. SeeJon Gabel et. al., Growing Diversification in HMOs, 1988-1994, 54 MED.
CARE RES. & REv. 101, 101 (1997) ("Today, most HMOs view themselves as managed care organizations/MCOs offering an array of health plans and products, not
as traditional close-ended HMOs."). At least one union is attempting to set up its
own HMO, which it claims will be less profit-driven (and therefore more virtuous)
than the available alternatives. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Union Plans to Market Own
H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at BI ("What bothers us is for-profit companies
taking health care dollars, putting them in their pockets and then not delivering
health care."). A number of physician groups are attempting to do the same thing.
See Stuart Auerbach, Doctors' Alliance Has a Remedy for Managed-CareLimits, WASH.
POST, Dec. 30, 1996, at F12 ("A handful of doctors groups in states as varied as
Texas, Florida, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Florida [sic] are trying to
form their own health care plans."); Rachel Kreier, How and Why Doctors on L.L
Formed Their Own H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1996, at 13LI:4 (noting that physician-run HMO is way for doctors to "regain strength lost to managed care
companies").
Of course, the decision to be "virtuous" on the payment of ED charges is likely
to be reflected in the premium, other coverage terms or both.
170. Professor Epstein nicely described why such cases are inevitable:
First-best solutions are rarely, if ever, possible; thus the beginning of wisdom is to seek rules that minimize the level of imperfections, not to pretend that these do not exist. No contract, no association is ever bullet
proof: no matter what rights, duties, institutions, and remedies are chosen, in some circumstances they will be found wanting. Bad outcomes are
therefore consistent with good institutions, and we cannot discredit these
institutions with carefully selected illustrations of their failures. Counterexamples may be brought to bear against any set of human institutions.
The social question, however, is concerned with the extent of the fall from
grace. The fact of the fall should be taken as a necessary truth, not a
shocking revelation. Perfection is obtainable in the world of mathematics, not in the world of human institutions.
RicHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WoRLD 32 (1995). From the other
end of the political spectrum, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 41 (1996)
("Although I have labored long and hard to canvas the faults of the adversary sys-
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trative and incentive costs is inevitable-and attempts to drive the latter to
zero send the former to astronomical heights in short order. 171 Those
who claim we can design our health insurance system as an exception to
this general rule should face a heavy burden of proof to explain exactly
how they will do so, and platitudes like "the proposed reform fairly balances the interests of all involved" or "the proposed reform is the best
solution" fall far short of the necessary showing.
Perhaps we should let these ardent reformers demonstrate the merits
of their reform on something else first. Why don't we start with the Internal Revenue Code, whose enforcement and refund provisions are built
around the same trade-off? 172 Or perhaps we could begin with civil discovery, where the debate over the mandatory disclosure provisions was
fought on the same grounds? 173 After they have established that the proposed reform is a net improvement on the status quo, the reformers
should also explain why their solution will improve the operation of cost74
limiting private contracts that are freely entered into by both parties.1
tern, we know that any system that we might substitute for it would have other,
perhaps worse flaws . . ").
171. See EPSTEIN, supra note 169, at 32 ("[T]he social function of law is to
minimize the sum of administrative (including error) costs and the costs associated
with the creation of poor incentives for individual action."). Of course, a comparative institutional perspective might lead one to opt for a different system, with a
different mix of administrative and incentive costs, or a larger total pie from which

these costs are subtracted. See generally
(1994).

NEIL

K

KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES

172. See, e.g., United States v. Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 851-52 (1997) (holding that courts lack equitable power to toll statute of limitations for filing tax re-

fund claims set forth in Internal Revenue Code and stating "[t]he nature and
potential magnitude of the administrative problem suggest that Congress decided

to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer
whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable tax
enforcement system"); Surrey, supra note 109, at 75 ("All this being so, the task of
the Service, and indeed of any tax administration, is how to achieve a rational
administration of Section 482 where there is a considerable potential area for its
application, where some companies sufficiently serious in number take unwarranted advantage of the situation created by the preference, but where every company cannot and should not be carefully scrutinized and its activities secondguessed just because those who yield to temptation are mixed among the
throng.").
173. See FED. R. Cry. P. 26(a) (providing for mandatory disclosure of certain
information); William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would
Disclosure Be More Effective Than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178, 182 (1991). Judge
Schwarzer accurately noted the fundamental trade-off:
It may be that in the disclosure system, on occasion, some information
helpful to a party that exhaustive discovery would uncover will not come
to light. But the question must be asked whether the marginal value of
preventing such occasional failures is worth the great cost of unrestrained
discovery. As Donald Elliott has observed, "Nourishing the fiction that
justice is a pearl beyond price has its own price."
Id. (footnote omitted).
174. One could argue that such contracts are inappropriate, because they undermine the purchase of public goods like emergency care. In fact, emergency
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Finally, the reformers should explain why, if the need for consumer protection reforms is so self-evident, the states have been so reluctant to implement them in the Medicaid program and state employee health
insurance plans, in which some or all of the costs of such reforms are onbudget. 175 In the absence of compelling evidence on each of these points,
the devil we know looks more and more appealing. The alternative to the
unattractive process of cost cutting is to accept indefinite increases in the
cost of health care-while other worthy projects are squeezed out or go
176
begging.
By setting a floor on the permissible level of coverage, the consumer
protections outlined in Part III constrain diversity of coverage and increase its cost. Conversely, a health insurance market in which true consumer protections were operative would offer a far-broader range of
coverage than is currently available and force policy-holders to face the
true costs of their decisions. The current system is designed to do almost
precisely the opposite, with consequences aptly described by Phil Gramm,
one of the few Senators with any training in economics:
We are putting people in a position where, when they are buying
health care, it is like going to the grocery store and having a grocery insurance policy, where 95 percent of what you put in your
grocery basket is going to be paid for by grocery insurance.
Needless to say, if you had such a policy, you would eat differcare is not really a public good-although it might well be good for the public for
it to be generally available. Even if emergency care is a public good, it does not
follow that one should pay for care for those in need by smacking those who are
insured and happen to go to the ED. The entire argument is reminiscent of that
made by those who opposed competition in the long-distance telephone market
because they knew it would destroy the long-standing substantial cross-subsidies of
local telephone service.
175. For an example of consumer protection legislation that was vetoed when
the state would have footed a substantial portion of the bill, see supra note 124.
176. See Ornstein, supranote 4, at A15 ("Cutting costs is not pretty. It involves
both disruptions and painful trade-offs.") In the face of such painful trade-offs,
further privatization of cost-containment initiatives is likely to be beneficial because it will lead to quicker and more differentiated results. See Havighurst, supra
note 35, at 123 (arguing that centralized decision making on consumer protection
will lead to poor results, and private contracts should be used to implement differential demands for health insurance coverage). Professor Reinhardt echoed these
sentiments in discussing medicare reform:
[The] delegation of the task of regulation to private regulators . . . will
spare Congress the unwelcome task of mud-wrestling annually with doctors, hospitals and other providers over fees and regulations, leaving that
troublesome task to private regulators (the private insurance industry)
who are not encumbered by notices of rule making, public commentaries, hearings, and the like. One great advantage of cost and quality control through private regulators is that the latter are swift and usually not
open to appeal.
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Demagoguery and Debate over Medicare Reform, 14 HEALTH Arr. 101,
103 (Winter 1995).
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177
ently, and so would your dog-this is part of the problem.

The current approach to consumer protection compounds this problem by proceeding on the erroneous assumption that markets are fallible
and regulation is not. 178 When our efforts to regulate make worse the
problems they seek to solve, it is time to call a halt and rethink the entire
strategy. It is too bad we cannot call 911, and have those who claim to be
protecting us receive some instruction on that point.
177. 142 CONG. REc. S9923 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Gramm).
178. See Easterbrook, supra note 165, at 215 ("[E]rror in legislation is common, and never more so than when the technology is galloping forward. Let us
not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we understand poorly."); Epstein, supra note 158, at 311 ("It would be easy to assume that
collective responses are preferred when markets are corrupt and governments virtuous. It is far harder to reach that conclusion when self-interest and corruption
creates [sic] difficulties from both quarters."); see also RONALD COASE, THE FiRM,
THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 26 (1988) ("The fact that governmental intervention
also has its costs makes it very likely that most 'externalities' should be allowed to
continue if the value of production is to be maximized. This conclusion is
strengthened if we assume that the government is... ignorant, subject to pressure,
and corrupt.").

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/3

58

